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Abstract
Like other Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries, Kuwait shares its wealth gen-
erously with its population. Yet the way 
in which it does so is inefficient, inequi-
table and economically distortive. This 
is true both for the country’s conven-
tional social safety mechanisms and for 
two large-scale ‘quasi-welfare’ policies: 
the provision of cheap or free energy and 
large-scale public sector employment for 
citizens. Current wealth sharing policies 
are fiscally unsustainable given current 
demographic trends, disproportionately 
benefit richer households and deeply 
distort markets for energy and labour.
Against this background, this paper anal-
yses a number of alternative mechanisms 
of social safety and wealth sharing that 
could be less distortionary and more 
conducive to private job generation for 
nationals. It focuses in particular on the 
idea of a ‘resource dividend’: an uncondi-
tional cash grant for adult nationals that 
could be provided in lieu of other, more 
unequal, discretionary and distortive 
forms of subsidies and rent sharing.
While the case for a resource dividend 
has been made in previous research, this 
paper goes beyond conceptual discus-
sion and illustrates in detail how such a 
dividend could be financed, what its dis-
tributional consequences would be and 
how it should be combined with other 
welfare policies to minimise distortions 
and maximise political feasibility. The 
paper develops concrete scenarios illus-
trating how different types of households 
and businesses would be impacted and 
discusses the administrative arrange-
ments likely to be required by resource 
dividend and social safety reform.
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Introduction
A state with a high per capita hydrocarbon income like Kuwait faces inevitable political 
pressures to distribute its hydrocarbon rents among the citizen population. In fact, given 
the size of Kuwait’s natural endowment, sharing wealth is arguably a moral and political 
imperative. Yet the way in which the Kuwaiti government currently distributes rents is 
very inefficient, inequitable and economically distortive. 
The country’s social safety mechanisms are generous, but also regressive, dispropor-
tionately benefiting richer households. More importantly, Kuwait uses two key channels 
outside of conventional welfare policies to share wealth with its citizens on an even larger 
scale: provision of cheap or free energy and large-scale public sector employment for cit-
izens. Both of these policies are fiscally unsustainable given current demographic trends. 
They also deeply distort markets of energy and labour, incentivising over-consumption 
and keeping nationals out of private employment; they have regressive distributional con-
sequences and they undermine the efficiency of both private industrial production and 
the public sector.
Against this background, this paper analyses a number of alternative mechanisms of social 
safety and wealth sharing that could be less distortionary and more conducive to private 
job generation for nationals. It will focus in particular on the idea of a ‘resource divi-
dend’: an unconditional cash grant for adult nationals that could be provided in lieu of 
other, more unequal, discretionary and distortive forms of subsidies and rent sharing. It 
will explain how the introduction of such a dividend would make it politically easier to 
adjust energy prices, would allow for gradual shrinkage of the size of the public sector, 
and would give citizens incentives to become employees or entrepreneurs in the private 
sector. A resource dividend would also facilitate the reform of existing social safety poli-
cies to become more targeted and outcome-oriented.
While the case for a resource dividend (RD) has been made in previous research, this 
paper goes beyond conceptual discussion and illustrates in some detail how an RD could 
be financed, what its distributional consequences would be and how it should be com-
bined with other welfare policies. The paper develops concrete scenarios illustrating 
how different types of households and businesses would be impacted and discusses the 
administrative arrangements likely to be required by RD and social safety reform.
The paper builds on existing research about wealth distribution and social safety net 
(SSN) reform in Kuwait, notably the 2015 World Bank report on modernising Kuwaiti 
social safety policies. This paper does take a more holistic view of Kuwait’s welfare pol-
icies and the underlying political economy, however. It is a key assumption of the paper 
that it is difficult to reform individual components of Kuwait’s wealth sharing regime 
without taking the larger political economy context into account. It is, for example, hard 
to introduce means-testing and clearer targeting of SSN policies without a quid pro quo 
that allows the government to build a broader reform coalition among Kuwaiti house-
holds. Simply reducing entitlements is unlikely to work – but reforming them in a way that 
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means a majority of citizens gains should be possible.
It should be noted that this paper only deals with welfare and rent sharing policies that 
involve direct material transfers and are clearly distortive and regressive. It does not 
discuss the free provision of public goods like health and education to Kuwaiti citizens. 
There are large efficiencies to be gained in reforming these services too, but the challenges 
involved are quite different and best analysed separately in their own right.
The paper starts with a detailed overview of current wealth sharing policies in Kuwait 
and their distortive economic consequences and unsustainable fiscal costs. It specifically 
covers the provision of cheap energy, government employment and conventional social 
safety mechanisms and transfers, including employment subsidies currently available for 
Kuwaitis in the private sector. The following section presents alternative wealth sharing 
and social safety mechanisms, including the RD idea and means-tested social safety poli-
cies tied to more active labour market policies. It discusses these issues both conceptually 
and in terms of the available international experience, suggesting cash grants that are 
differentiated by employment status, with citizens outside of the public sector receiving 
higher grants.
This is followed by a detailed section modelling the potential scale of an RD for Kuwaitis 
that could be financed out of domestic energy price reforms. The paper focuses on the 
welfare consequences for Kuwaiti households on different income levels, and the con-
sequences for the operating costs of local businesses relying on energy inputs. It also 
discusses the option of providing additional cash grants financed through expected 
savings from lower public employment. These savings could be realised through a freeze 
on public employment and the probable exit of a share of public employees who want to 
receive the higher cash grants available to individuals outside of the government sector. 
The paper’s final section discusses various institutional and policy design questions that 
would need to be addressed in the implementation of the RD and accompanying social 
safety reforms.
Objectives of Welfare and Wealth Distribution Policies
Before analysing the status quo of wealth distribution in Kuwait, we need to define which 
long-term objectives welfare and wealth distribution should serve. This will allow us to 
evaluate both current practices and potential future reforms.
Large-scale distribution of hydrocarbon rents among the Kuwaiti population cannot and 
arguably should not be abandoned. But which principles should guide rent distribution? 
The following four objectives are generally agreed in principle but often lost from sight in 
practice:
1. Long-run fiscal sustainability: Rent distribution should not threaten the fiscal health 
of government in either the short or the long run. The empirical ‘ratchet effect’ of rent 
distribution – in which new distributional entitlements are quickly created but very 
hard to dismantle – makes sustainability a particularly pressing concern. The finite 
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nature of rents and uncertain expectations on future hydrocarbons prices need to be 
factored into the distributional regime.
2. Autonomous growth path: All of the world’s major resource-dependent economies 
have adopted long-term objectives to become independent of rents in their long-run 
growth and diversification path. This requires technological progress, a move into sec-
tors of production with reduced (direct or indirect) rent-dependence, and in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) cases at least, reduced reliance on low-skilled migrant 
labour that serves mostly factor-intensive, low-tech production. There is much talk in 
the GCC about transitioning to a new ‘knowledge economy’, but the constraints that 
current rent distribution and labour market structures exert in this context are seldom 
analysed.
3. A productive role for nationals in their own economy: Distribution should be struc-
tured so as to minimise work disincentives for nationals, should not dissuade them 
from acquiring skills relevant for productive employment and should allow them to 
join the private sector as entrepreneurs or employees.
4. High and continued citizen welfare: Wealth distribution should be continuous, effi-
cient and equal; that is, it should be independent of oil price fluctuations, maximise 
the ‘bang for the buck’ and provide equal access to all citizens in a fair and transparent 
manner. 
In practice, the distribution regime in Kuwait (as in the rest of the GCC) has grown in a 
haphazard and path-dependent manner, with the result that such criteria have rarely been 
taken into account systematically.
The above criteria would appear to be uncontroversial, yet distributional regimes in most 
resource-rich countries deviate far from them in practice.1 Kuwait is no exception. This 
paper aims to identify ‘first best’ policies that are politically feasible and attain the above 
four objectives.
Sources and Data
This paper relies on a wide range of qualitative and quantitative data. This includes house-
hold, labour and establishment survey data from Kuwait’s Central Bureau of Statistics; 
fiscal data from the Ministry of Finance and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); elec-
tricity, water and fuel consumption, revenue and production data from the Ministry of 
1   One could make an academic argument for eschewing economic diversification and relying purely 
on rent income that gradually transitions from oil rents to investment revenue on growing govern-
ment-held overseas financial assets; see e.g. Giacomo Luciani, ‘Allocation vs. Production States’, in 
Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds), The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm, 1987). In prac-
tice, all GCC governments aspire to local diversification, an objective that they are very unlikely to 
abandon. At a minimum, governments should groom more sophisticated service sectors that generate 
more value added on the basis of oil rents and local state spending, similar to the Norwegian economy 
(which continues to export mostly hydrocarbons yet has a mature service economy). Such an objective 
is complementary rather than rival to the strategy of gradually transitioning from oil rents to overseas 
investment rents, which is discussed below in this paper.
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Electricity and Water (MoEW); and demographic and administrative employment and 
demographic data from the Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI). It builds on a 
number of existing studies about wealth distribution and SSN reform in Kuwait. It also 
relies on a daily survey of the Kuwaiti press over the last decade, as well as a number of 
qualitative interviews with policy-makers, citizens and private sector stakeholders under-
taken during a field mission in February 2019. 
I have not enjoyed access to raw survey data, which means that some of the quantitative 
estimates in this paper are preliminary (and identified as such). I hope that future ver-
sions of this research can build on such data to allow for more precise scenario-building.
I would like to express special gratitude to the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement 
of Sciences (KFAS) and the Kuwait Public Policy Center (KPPC) for supporting the grant 
that has enabled this project and for critical support on the ground in Kuwait. I would 
furthermore like to thank the General Secretariat of the Supreme Council for Planning and 
the staff at the KPPC at the Secretariat for excellent support in setting up key interviews 
and acquiring local data.
Context: Wealth Distribution in Kuwait
This paper is not the first to point out that existing policies of wealth sharing in Kuwait 
and the GCC, although successful in terms of creating a broad middle class of citizens, are 
fiscally costly and economically distortive.2 Among GCC states, Kuwait is one of the most 
generous, to the extent that spending on citizen benefits crowds out other forms of eco-
nomic development spending. This is partially because of the strong influence of Kuwait’s 
parliament, which valiantly defends the entitlements of its citizens.3 It is also rooted in 
Kuwait’s constitutional framework. Article 11 of the 1962 constitution states that ‘The State 
ensures aid for citizens in old age, sickness, or inability to work. It also provides them with 
services of social security, social aid, and medical care.’ This paper provides an update on 
Kuwait’s energy subsidy policies, public sector employment practices, social safety and 
security policies and other transfers. 
Energy and Water Prices
The availability of cheap energy is a key channel of wealth distribution across most of the 
2   Laura El-Katiri, Bassam Fattouh and Paul Segal, ‘Anatomy of an Oil-Based Welfare State: Rent Distri-
bution in Kuwait’, LSE Kuwait Programme Research Papers 13 (London, 2011); Michael Herb, ‘A Nation 
of Bureaucrats: Political Participation and Economic Diversification in Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 41/3 (2009), pp. 375–95; Steffen Hertog, ‘Rent Dis-
tribution, Labour Markets and Development in High-Rent Countries’, LSE Kuwait Programme Research 
Papers 40 (London, 2016); ‘Labor Market Reforms to Boost Employment and Productivity in the GCC’, 
IMF (Washington, DC, October 2013); ‘Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications’, IMF (Wash-
ington, DC, January 2013).
3   Michael Herb, The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).
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Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,4 but it is practised with particular generos-
ity in Kuwait. 
Facing a strong decrease in oil revenues, the government increased gasoline and diesel 
prices in September 2016 to between 85 and 165 fils per litre of gasoline (depending on 
quality) and 115 fils per litre of gas oil. This was equivalent to an average raise of 70 percent 
for gasoline and 100% for diesel (although with some exemptions for large consumers), 
thereby bringing fuel prices close to their value on international spot markets. At the same 
time, efforts to generally increase tariffs for electricity and (desalinated) water have failed. 
The partial tariff increases that happened in 2017 have mostly affected customers in the 
public sector, where water and electricity prices are now close to the cost of production 
(see Tables 1 and 2) – but where fiscal savings are limited, as one part of government 
transfers funds to another one. Kuwait has largely lagged behind the rest of the GCC in its 
energy subsidy reforms, arguably due to its more complex political economy and better 
collective organisation of vested distributional interests through parliament and civil 
society5 – highlighting the need for creative solutions that minimise the number of losers 
from any reform.
Both water and electricity services are still provided almost for free for Kuwaiti citizens, 
who predominantly live in private houses. The electricity tariff structure for such houses 
has remained unchanged since 1966. In practice, the collection of electricity and water 
bills is not systematically enforced. 
Table 1: Current Kuwaiti Water Tariffs (KD)
Sector Price per 1,000 Imperial Gallons
Government 4.00
Investment and commercial 2.00
Others (except residential) 2.00
Industrial and agriculture 1.25
Agricultural and industrial (producers)6 0.75
Water filling station 0.50
Reference: average OECD price level 4.50
Source: MoEW
4   Laura El-Katiri and Bassam Fattouh, ‘A Brief Political Economy of Energy Subsidies in the Middle East 
and North Africa’, International Development Policy 7 (2017). Available at http://poldev.revues.orgbcrfj.
revues.org/2267 (accessed 21 February 2020);  ‘Energy Subsidy Reform’, IMF.
5   Tom Moerenhout, ‘Energy Pricing Reforms in the Gulf: A Trend but Not (Yet) a Norm’, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (Winnipeg, 2018).
6  Here and in all following tables, ‘producers’ are firms that have proved to authorities that they are 
actually producing goods and services; those without such proof are considered inactive and subject to 
a somewhat higher tariff.
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Table 2: Current Kuwaiti Electricity Tariffs (KD)
Sector Price per kWh
Government 0.025
Investment and commercial 0.005
Industrial and agriculture 0.005
Agricultural and industrial (producers) 0.003
Others (except residential) 0.012
Houses (Kuwaiti citizens) 0.002
Reference: average US price 0.040
Source: MoEW
As Figure 1 shows, low water costs for consumers have led to rapid consumption growth, 
with total distilled water production in Kuwait doubling in less than two decades. As desali-
nation is energy intensive and requires large infrastructure, this creates a significant fiscal 
burden. In 2017, 62 percent of water consumption was residential, making households the 
most important target category for bringing escalating water consumption under control.
Total revenue from fresh water sales in 2017 was KD 82 million (MoEW). If water was 
generally charged at OECD price levels of around KD 4.5 per 1,000 imperial gallons, and 
bills fully collected, the government would collect more than KD 700 million. 
Figure 1: Total Production of Distilled Water, 1998–2017 (million imperial gallons)
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Figure 2 shows a similar escalation in the consumption of electricity, which has doubled 
in about 15 years. The rapid growth in electricity consumption has led to brownouts and 
blackouts for Kuwaiti consumers. 
Figure 2: Electricity Produced by Kuwaiti Power Stations under the MoEW, 1998–
2017 (million kWh)
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Just as for water, most electricity consumption is residential (see Table 3): private resi-
dences, investment buildings (with apartments, predominantly inhabited by foreigners) 
and public housing together account for 68 percent of the available electricity load – a 
high share by international comparison. 
Table 3: Distribution of Electricity Loads across Sectors, 2017
KW Percentage
Private residential 483206 50.5
Government 77873 8.1
Investment buildings 117727 12.3
Commercial 149822 15.7
Industrial 48399 5.1
Agricultural 29730 3.1
Public housing 50373 5.3
Source: MoEW
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The combined electricity load of producing sectors is only 23.8 percent of the total, which 
is low: internationally, industry consumes closer to 50% of total energy.7 This means that if 
escalating consumption is to be tackled, residential electricity should be the prime target.
As in the water sector, total government revenue in the electricity sector is very low, reach-
ing only KD 109 million in 2017 (MoEW). At average US prices of 13 cents per kWh (a 
low price in comparison with other developed countries), fully collected revenue would 
amount to KD 2.57 billion or about 6 percent of GDP.
A popular counter-argument to criticisms of low energy prices in the GCC is that energy 
is cheap and plentiful in the region. Economically speaking, this is misleading: power and 
desalination plants in Kuwait are powered either with fuel oil that could be sold at high 
prices internationally, or by gas that at least in part needs to be imported at high prices 
from abroad. The country consumes more than 450,000 barrels’ worth of its own energy 
per day and derives almost no revenue from this. If the same amount of crude was sold 
internationally at oil prices of $65/barrel, the revenue from this would be KD 3.25 billion or 
almost 8 percent of GDP. This implies a large fiscal ‘opportunity cost’ in terms of foregone 
revenue that could be used for other purposes, including welfare provision for citizens.
There are other reasons why sharing wealth through cheap energy is a bad idea, which have 
come to be well documented in the international literature.8 Notably, low-price energy is 
also an unfair way of providing welfare as the benefits of cheap electricity, water and fuel 
accrue disproportionately to wealthy households with higher levels of consumption and 
are hence equivalent to a regressive tax. 
It is doubtful that the utility that consumers derive from cheap energy is anywhere near its 
opportunity cost and a good deal of the nearly cost-free consumption of energy in Kuwaiti 
households is frivolous as low costs incentivise over-consumption. There are no incen-
tives for buying more fuel-efficient cars and appliances, insulating houses or turning off 
the lights – all of which would only modestly inconvenience most consumers, but could 
significantly improve the long-term fiscal position of the government and liberate funds 
for more productive uses.
In the private sector, cheap energy can also distort investment decisions, leading to decling 
7   See ‘BP Energy Outlook’, BP. Available at https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/
energy-outlook/demand-by-sector.html (accessed 21 February 2020).
8   Taimur Baig, Amine Mati, David Coady and Joseph Ntamatunigiro, ‘Domestic Petroleum Product 
Prices and Subsidies: Recent Developments and Reform Strategies’, IMF (Washington, DC, March 
2007). Available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0771.pdf (accessed 21 February 
2020); Joshua Charap, Arthur Ribeiro da Silva and Pedro Rodriguez, ‘Energy Subsidies and Energy Con-
sumption: A Cross-Country Analysis’, IMF (Washington, DC, May 2013). Available at https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2276347 (accessed 21 February 2020); ‘Case Studies on Energy 
Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications’, IMF (Washington, DC, January 2013); Paul Stevens and 
Glada Lahn, ‘Burning Oil to Keep Cool: The Hidden Energy Crisis in Saudi Arabia’, Chatham House 
(London, December 2011). Available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/180825 
(accessed 21 February 2020).
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energy efficiency and reliance on resource-intensive rather than efficient technology.9 Dif-
ferent from subsidised public services like health and education, energy consumption also 
entails negative environmental externalities in terms of local pollution and a large contri-
bution to global warming. Very low consumer and industrial energy prices also make the 
transition towards more sustainable forms of energy difficult – despite the advantageous 
geography of Kuwait, which enjoys abundant, almost continuous sunshine. It is clear that 
sharing wealth by providing cheap energy is costly, regressive and deeply distortive.
Other Subsidised Goods
In addition to cheap energy, the Kuwaiti government also provides food subsidies on 
certain basic items, such as rice, sugar and cooking oil, through the use of ration cards for 
Kuwaitis, administered through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI). Accord-
ing to a recent MoCI statement, around KD 238 million were spent on various kinds of 
subsidised food supplies and construction material in 2018, including KD 108 million for 
basic food supplies and KD 4.5 million for various types of baby formula and nutrients. 
The estimated number of beneficiaries from food supplies (primarily Kuwaitis) totalled 
2 million.10
While the use of food subsidies in a rich country like Kuwait is unusual, the cost incurred 
is orders of magnitude below that created by cheap energy, and incentives are likely to be 
less distortive, as it is easier to over-consume energy than to over-consume food items.
Government Employment
The most important channel of wealth distribution in Kuwait, however, is not energy sub-
sidies but rather public employment of citizens, which is far larger in scale than the actual 
administrative needs of government would require. Kuwait has for decades provided a de 
facto employment guarantee for its citizens in government agencies. Overall recruitment 
planning has generally been driven not by administrative needs but by the anticipated 
annual supply of new Kuwaiti job-seekers.11
As a result, 335,000 Kuwaitis worked in the public sector in 2018, compared to only 64,000 
in the private sector and a total citizen population of 1.33 million citizens. Government 
salaries accounted for 41 percent of total government expenditure in 2018/19, considerably 
above the international norm of 20–30% and more than twice the country’s investment 
expenditure. Kuwait’s government wage bill as a percentage of GDP is 1.5 times larger than 
that of other GCC countries.12
9   Steffen Hertog, ‘Making Wealth Sharing More Efficient in High-Rent Countries: The Citizens’ Income’, 
Energy Transitions 1/2 (2017), art. 7.
10   A. Saleh and Meshaal Al-Enezi, ‘Rights Watch Team “Pleased” with Kuwait’, Kuwait Times, 13 February 
2019 (citing the MoCI). Available at https://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/rights-watch-team-pleased-
with-developments-in-kuwait (accessed 21 February 2020).
11   Herb, The Wages of Oil.
12   ‘Kuwait: 2019 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report’, IMF (Washington, DC, 2019), p. 11.
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Evidence of overstaffing is pervasive. About 85 percent of Kuwaitis in employment work in 
the public sector, compared to an international average of 10–30%. Senior administrators 
in many agencies informally concede that a large share of their staff is inactive for much of 
the time. One senior technocrat told us that he might actually need about 150 of the 800 
employees in his agency. One striking indicator of overstaffing is that the salary expendi-
ture of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MOSAL) in 2013 was larger than the total 
volume of social transfers the ministry provided.13
Excess public sector employment creates not only direct salary costs but also overhead 
costs in terms of building, infrastructure and utility use and commuting-induced traffic 
jams. Moreover, it reduces the overall efficiency and responsiveness of the bureaucracy, 
as staff are often not recruited in line with needs and qualifications, and responsibility 
and accountability become diffuse.14 This is reflected in Kuwait’s middling (and declin-
ing) World Bank Governance Indicator score for ‘government effectiveness’, which has 
recently dropped below the global average, much below that of OECD countries and also 
discernibly below that of Kuwait’s GCC neighbours.
The easy availability of government employment distorts labour market incentives for 
citizens. Although the private sector has more well-paid jobs to offer at the top of the wage 
distribution, on average Kuwaiti citizens are paid better in government jobs than in private 
sector positions (Figure 3). 
13   ‘Developing a Strategic Social Safety Net Framework for Kuwait’, World Bank, unpublished report 
(Washington, DC, 2015).
14   Ugo Fasano and Rishi Goyal, ‘Emerging Strains in GCC Labor Markets’, IMF Middle East and Central 
Asia Department (Washington, DC, 2004); Ingo Forstenlechner and Emilie Rutledge, ‘Unemployment in 
the Gulf: Time to Update the “Social Contract”’, Middle East Policy 17/2 (1 June 2010), pp. 38–51; Steffen 
Hertog, ‘A Comparative Assessment of Labor Market Nationalization Policies in the GCC’, in Steffen 
Hertog (ed.), Labour Market, Unemployment, and Migration in the GCC (Geneva: Gulf Research Center, 
2011); Richard Shediac and Hatem Samman, ‘Meeting the Employment Challenge in the GCC’, Booz & 
Co (Dubai, 2010).
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Figure 3: Percentage Distribution of Monthly Wages Paid to Kuwaitis by Sector, 
2015 (KD)
Source: Central Statistical Bureau (CSB) labour force survey
As importantly, government jobs are highly secure and come with short working hours. 
Given minimal education requirements, new job-seekers are in practice assured of a gov-
ernment job if they want one, although there can be waiting times until an appointment 
which differ somewhat by education level and gender. The waiting time until a job is pro-
vided can be bridged with generous social benefits provided by the MoSAL as well as other 
government agencies (see below).
As a result, few nationals of working age are available for private employment. The 
dominant share of potentially productive national manpower is ‘parked’ in jobs whose 
economic contribution is in many cases questionable. Public sector employment policies 
give questionable education incentives, leading to an undersupply of national skills rele-
vant in the private market and an overproduction of graduates in disciplines with limited 
practical use.15
Even when citizens join the private sector, this is often only a waystation en route to even-
tual public employment. Recent statistics show that 11,443 citizens resigned from their 
private sector jobs between 2015 and 2017 and joined the government.16 While we lack 
15   Hertog, ‘Comparative Assessment’; ‘Developing a Strategic Social Safety Net Framework for Kuwait’.
16   A. Saleh, ‘11,443 Nationals Moved from Private to Public Sector Jobs in Three Years’, Kuwait Times, 
25 November 2018. Available at https://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/11443-nationals-moved-from-pri-
vate-to-public-sector-jobs-in-three-years (accessed 21 February 2020).
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statistics about movements in the other direction, interviews indicate that almost no one 
moves from government to the private sector. While government employment of Kuwaitis 
has been growing consistently, private job creation for citizens has stalled. In fact, while 
the number of Kuwaiti government employees grew by about 64,000 from 2009 to 2018, 
the number of Kuwaitis in the private sector dropped slightly, from 67,000 to 64,000, in 
the same period. In other words, in just nine recent years, government employment of 
citizens grew by as much as the total current stock of privately employed Kuwaitis.
The weak presence of national employees in private employment reduces their interest 
in a thriving and diversified private sector and often leads to a zero-sum conflict between 
citizens and business when it comes to fiscal and economic policy decisions: while busi-
ness prefers development-oriented government spending and the opening of new sectors 
to private investment, citizens prefer social spending and state provision of goods and ser-
vices. This tension is particularly acute in Kuwait, where citizen interests are powerfully 
organised through parliament.17
While excessive employment in the public sector is often decried by local economists and 
technocrats, it has become such a core plank of the local social contract that it has become 
impossible to slow down or reverse – at least as long as there is no material ‘quid pro quo’ 
that would make it politically acceptable for citizens to reduce government hiring.
A further key factor that makes citizens uncompetitive in the private sector – and allows 
private business to get by without employing citizens – is the availability of low-cost 
foreign labour in Kuwait. As Figure 4 shows, while Kuwaitis in the private sector earn less 
on average than in government, privately employed expatriates are drastically cheaper.
The large wage gap is not just a function of Kuwaitis’ higher education: while Kuwaitis on 
average are better educated than foreign workers, the absolute gap in earnings between the 
two is high (and roughly similar) within all education categories (see Figure 5). In terms of 
the relative ratio, the gap between low-skilled Kuwaitis and foreigners is the largest, with 
Kuwaitis being paid about 8 times more than foreigners. From an employer’s perspective, 
foreigners have the largest cost advantage in the low- to medium-skilled labour market 
segments.
17   Herb, ‘Nation of Bureaucrats’; Steffen Hertog, ‘The Private Sector and Reform in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council’, LSE Kuwait Programme Research Papers 30 (London, 2013).
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Figure 4: Average Monthly Salaries by Sector, Gender and Nationality, Q3/2018 
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Figure 5: Average Monthly Wages by Level of Education and Nationality, all Sectors, 
2015 (KD)
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The double wage gap in terms of both sector and nationality drives Kuwaitis to seek gov-
ernment employment and pushes employers to seek foreign workers. Kuwaitis are driven 
out of the private sector from both sides.
Existing private jobs held by foreigners almost all pay very low wages: only about 60,000 
of the 1.61 million foreigners in the private sector in 2015 earned more than KD 600/month 
(see Figure 6), which some of our interviewees have identified as the minimum socially 
acceptable monthly wage for citizens. Among these better-paid foreigners, many perform 
technical roles that will be hard to ‘Kuwaitise’ in the short to medium term.
Figure 6: Percentage Distribution of Monthly Private Sector Wages Paid to  
Foreigners, 2015 (KD)
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The predominant reliance on low-skilled foreigners has helped control cost levels in the 
private sector, but has also led to stagnant productivity across private sectors in the GCC, 
where technology use remains relatively limited.18
The structure of the private labour market means that if the government wants to increase 
the number of privately employed Kuwaitis: 
1. some of this will need to happen in the low- to mid-wage sector; and
2. it is unlikely to happen without further government intervention to improve take-
home pay. 
The government already provides significant wage subsidies for citizens employed in the 
private sector, which are discussed below. Lower-skilled Kuwaitis especially might need 
18   Hertog, ‘Private Sector and Reform’.
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further aid to reach socially acceptable income levels in the private sector, however.
Other Social Safety and Wealth Transfers
In addition to the provision of subsidised energy and government jobs, the Kuwaiti gov-
ernment also shares its wealth through a number of conventional SSN and welfare policies.
Pensions
The pensions system for Kuwaitis is integrated across the public and private sector and 
is, in principle, financed through contributions. This systems design puts it ahead of the 
fragmented schemes of many other Arab countries – yet the generosity of the system has 
created sustainability issues and forces the government to regularly inject new capital.
For both the basic and supplementary pension, contributors pay 5 percent of their salary, 
while employers and the government pay in 10% each. While these contributions are sub-
stantial, the contribution period is short: the pension age in 2019 was 49 for women and 54 
for men, to be increased to 50 and 55 respectively in 2020 – far below international stan-
dards, despite life expectancy close to OECD levels. Depending on gender and personal 
circumstances, only 15 or 20 years of contributions are needed for a full pension.
The monthly basic pension (on earnings up to KD 1,500/month) is 65 percent of the 
insured’s last monthly earnings (75% for military personnel), plus 2% for each year of 
contributions exceeding 15 years, up to 95% of earnings. The supplementary pension (for 
earnings between KD 1,500 and 2,750 /month) is 25–30% of the insured person’s average 
monthly earnings during the total contribution period, plus additional percentages for 
each year of contributions.
The average pension in 2016 reached KD 1,264, more than three-quarters of the average 
government salary,19 considerably above typical international ratios. In 2018, the Public 
Institution for Social Security (PIFSS) reported that the total number of retirees receiving 
KD 2,000 or more in their monthly pension reached 15,275, those receiving KD 1,000–
2,000 reached 73,057, while those receiving less than KD 1,000 numbered 34,356.20 Given 
the short contribution periods, pensions arrangements are very generous – and there is 
political pressure from parliament to make arrangements even more free-handed.
As a result of this generosity, and despite annual government contributions above KD 2 
billion per year (4.6 percent of GDP), the PIFSS has been accumulating a large actuarial 
deficit in recent years and currently is only about 60–70% funded. This is despite the fact 
that it has received repeated, large, one-off injections of capital from government beyond 
the statutory public contributions. The reform of wealth distribution in Kuwait will also 
19   ‘Kuwait Has Lowest Retiring Age Among GCC Countries: PIFSS’, Arabic Times, 5 October 2017. Avail-
able at http://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/kuwait-lowest-retiring-age-among-gcc-countries-pifss 
(accessed 21 February 2020).
20   A. Saleh, ‘Govt Failed to Implement Replacement Policy for 15 Years: Lawmaker’, Kuwait Times, 24 
November 2018. Available at https://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/govt-failed-to-implement-replace-
ment-policy-for-15-years-lawmaker (accessed 21 February 2020). 
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have to address the sustainability of the public pensions system, which will become more 
pressing as the national population ages.
Unemployment Insurance
In 2013, Kuwait also introduced a new, compulsory unemployment insurance regime for 
its citizens. Under the system, Kuwaiti employees and their employers contribute 0.5 
percent each to the insurance fund, supplemented by another 0.5% contribution from 
the public treasury (similar to the above pensions arrangement). Employees who have 
been employed for at least six months are entitled to 60 percent of their last monthly 
salary for a period of six months following unemployment, whether in the case of res-
ignation or termination.
The provision of benefits, even in cases of voluntary resignation, is generous. Interviews 
at the PIFSS indicate, however, that the take-up of insurance payments has been below 
expectations, probably due to the fairly static nature of the private labour market for 
Kuwaitis. The insurance system slightly narrows the gap in job security between the gov-
ernment and private sector, but not enough to substantially narrow the attractiveness gap 
between the two sectors.
Social Safety Net Allowances and Payments
The MoSAL also provides a wide range of social allowances for Kuwaitis falling into a 
range of categories. The total volume of the allowance disbursements is small compared 
to the government’s expenditure on subsidies, employment or pensions. Perhaps more 
importantly, it is not fit for purpose in several regards as it is regressive (disproportionately 
benefiting richer households), is not tied to systematic activation or assistance policies 
that would help recipients out of welfare dependence and lacks systematic data analysis 
and follow-up mechanisms to assess its impact.
The 1978 social assistance law makes a range of persons eligible for welfare payments: 
widows, divorced women, orphans, the sick, the disabled, families of imprisoned persons, 
financially incapable individuals, the elderly, students, non-working women and unmar-
ried women. The system consists of 15 different allowances, making it fairly complex and 
difficult to understand. A World Bank survey conducted in 2014 showed that 77 percent 
of the beneficiaries knew about their social assistance programme through a relative or 
friend rather than from official sources.21
The provision of some of the MoSAL allowances is in principle means-tested, requiring 
a single-person household to have less than KD 559 of monthly income. In practice, such 
tests are not well implemented and many higher-income households receive assistance 
payments. Some of the benefits, like those for single women above 55, are officially cate-
gorical and provided to all applicants falling into the category. 
21   ‘Developing a Strategic Social Safety Net Framework for Kuwait’, World Bank, p. 34.
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The family allowance (which in principle is means-tested) varies from KD 255 per month 
to KD 1,200, depending on family circumstances. The number of households receiving 
MoSAL allowances increased from 30,000 in 2011 to about 50,000 in 2018.22
A number of other government agencies also provide allowances to specific categories 
of citizens: married Kuwaitis who meet certain criteria are entitled to housing subsidies 
and zero-interest loans which can be used to purchase plots or houses from the National 
Housing Authority at subsidised prices. While waiting for such plots or houses, Kuwaitis 
are entitled to rent smaller houses from the Authority at rents far below market rates. The 
government also subsidises construction material for houses built on lands purchased 
from the National Housing Authority. Other benefits provided by government include 
monthly stipends for all Kuwaiti students in higher education, financial assistance for 
disabled adults and children and zero-interest loans to finance marriages. 
Finally, the government and leadership provide occasional ad hoc transfers, such as Amiri 
grants that can be paid at times of high oil revenue or political crises (such as the KD 1,000 
per citizen grant distributed in 2011), or ad hoc loan forgiveness that is used to write off 
capital or interest on loans financing home maintenance, holidays abroad or cars.23
Most of the regular individual benefits listed here cost between 0.1 and 0.3 percent of 
GDP per year, so are much smaller in scale than energy subsidies or pensions. Yet their 
total volume is considerable: the cost of non-contributory social benefits provided by the 
government in 2018/19 reached KD 1.2 billion, representing 2.8 percent of GDP – a consid-
erable item that, if well spent, should have substantial welfare benefits.24 
In practice, however, the allocation of benefits is less than efficient: first, the level of 
MoSAL social assistance provided is quite generous, equivalent to the minimum wage for 
Kuwaitis in the public sector, and more than three times the national poverty line if the 
foreign population is included in calculating it. Previous studies have identified benefits 
as an important disincentive to seeking a job and as an important reason for the presence 
of a large, economically inactive population of citizens.25 
To the extent that means-testing is implemented for specific benefits, it also creates incen-
tives against work, as all benefits are lost once personal income from other sources passes 
a certain threshold. This drives individuals to keep work income below the threshold.
Anecdotally, it appears clear that some of the recipients of MoSAL support could easily 
work if they wanted to. In 2013, close to 50 percent of beneficiaries and their dependents 
had a BA or higher degree. Beneficiaries include divorced women in their mid-20s with 
bachelor’s degrees from local or even US universities who chose to live off categorical 
22   ‘50,000 Kuwaiti Families Could Be Eligible for Social Aid’, Kuwait Times, 27 January 2019. Avail-
able at https://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/50000-kuwaiti-families-could-be-eligible-for-social-aid 
(accessed 21 February 2020).
23   El-Katiri, Fattouh and Segal, ‘Anatomy of an Oil-Based Welfare State’.
24   ‘Kuwait: 2019 Article IV Consultation’, IMF.
25   ‘Developing a Strategic Social Safety Net Framework for Kuwait’, World Bank.
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assistance for divorcees instead of seeking gainful employment.26 There is also evidence 
that single working females resign from their jobs after turning 35 years old in order to 
draw on assistance provided to single women of this age and older.27 A 2014 World Bank 
survey of MoSAL beneficiaries revealed that 84 percent of them were not interested in 
finding a job and 9.8% wanted to work in the public sector only.28 The evidence that the 
current benefits system provides incentives against work is strong.
In some cases, the social purpose of specific benefits is also unclear: in early 2014, all 
Kuwaiti females above 55 years of age were made eligible for social assistance, with no 
clear means-testing arrangements, causing a large increase in the number of beneficiaries 
– by 14,000 new cases.29
In other cases, the categorical targeting of social assistance programmes invites manipu-
lation: the category of divorced women, for example, doubled from 8,000 cases in 2011 to 
more than 16,000 by early 2014.30 Interviews indicate that Kuwaiti women have started to 
get pro forma divorces in local courts, allowing them to apply for divorcee benefits, while 
getting immediately remarried to their spouses across the border in Saudi Arabia without 
the knowledge of Kuwaiti authorities. Conversely, there appear to be ‘ghost marriages’ 
for the sake of receiving housing benefits. The MoSAL’s capacity for assessing beneficia-
ries’ real incomes, family and household status seems limited and the annual follow-up 
research that should happen in principle rarely occurs.31
The complexity of the benefits system, the administration’s limited capacity for data-gath-
ering and follow-up, and the government’s limited political appetite for cracking down on 
manipulation all create considerable opportunities to ‘game’ the system. In fact, accord-
ing to a 2014 World Bank survey, half of the beneficiaries saw social assistance payments 
as an ‘ongoing assistance providing them with stability’ rather than a temporary form of 
support allowing them to rejoin the labour market. A quarter even perceived this social 
assistance as ‘one of their rights and the least they can receive.’32 Various social assistance 
programmes ensure that most Kuwaitis enjoy a middle-class lifestyle, but they do so in a 
costly and unaccountable fashion that undermines incentives to be economically produc-
tive and benefits those citizens who are most adept at gaming the system in their favour.
A closely related problem with the current social assistance systems is that they are 
regressive: 2013 household survey data – the most recent publicly available – shows that 
the poorest 20 percent of Kuwaiti households receive a total average government trans-
fer of KD 90 per adult or equivalent per month, while the richest 20% of households 
receive around KD 180.33 Just like energy subsidies, the current cash transfer system ben-
26   Ibid., p. 33.
27   Ibid.
28   Ibid., p. 35.
29   Ibid., p. 18.
30   Ibid.
31   Ibid.
32   Ibid., p. 35.
33   Ibid., p. viii.
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efits richer households most of all – a feature that is pretty much unique to Kuwait, since 
in the rest of the world, cash benefits predominantly go to poorer households. While there 
are good justifications for sharing Kuwait’s natural wealth with its citizens in the form of 
cash payments, there is no conceivable reason for doing so in a way that predominantly 
benefits richer households.
‘Daʿm al-ʿamala’: Private Sector Wage Subsidies for Kuwaitis 
There is one final type of government transfer that is worth discussing in more detail due 
to its importance for the labour market behaviour of Kuwaitis: the monthly subsidies for 
privately employed Kuwaitis that have been provided by the Manpower and Government 
Restructuring Program (MGRP) since 2001, and which are informally known as daʿm 
al-ʿamala (wage support).
The levels of the basic allowance differ by family status and education level and are 
broadly in line with allowances in the public sector, which are similarly differentiated by 
family status. After a series of drastic public sector salary increases, the daʿm al-ʿamala 
allowances were also almost doubled in early 2013, reaching KD 790 per month for an 
unmarried holder of a bachelor’s degree in engineering. An unmarried high school gradu-
ate receives KD 557.
Table 4 shows the current daʿm allowances for single and married individuals differenti-
ated by education level. The allowance further grows by KD 50/month for each child, up to 
a total of seven children. The transfer schedule is unusual in that more educated nationals 
are more strongly subsidised. This contributes to the regressive nature of Kuwaiti social 
transfers mentioned above, as better-educated citizens generally have higher (non-bene-
fit) incomes to start with. Interviews in Kuwait also indicate that many of the multi-year, 
post-high-school training courses attended by Kuwaiti citizens are of low quality and 
merely serve the purpose of formally increasing one’s educational attainment to be able 
to draw higher benefits.
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Table 4: Monthly Private Sector Wage Subsidy for Kuwaitis by Level of Education, 
2019 (KD)
Degree Single Married
College degree: medicine, pharmaceutics, engineering 790 898
College degree: law, accounting, information systems, finance, economics, 
statistics, financial management, insurance, international business, banking 
sciences
740 848
College degree: other majors 690 798
Diploma or high school certificate + training course of no less than two years 629 723
High school diploma + training course of no less than three years 571 663
High school certificate 557 638
Middle school certificate + training course of no less than one year 517 598
Middle school certificate 511 590
Below middle school 456 534
Source: MGRP
Of the profits of publicly listed companies in Kuwait, 0.5 percent are used to finance the 
scheme. The revenue from this falls far short of its actual costs, however, requiring con-
siderable transfers from the government social affairs budget.
The programme initially contributed to a fairly fast increase in the private employment 
of Kuwaitis, which according to PACI data rose from about 30,000 in 2005 to 67,000 in 
2009 – significantly above the private employment rates in the GCC’s other two high-
rent countries, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where the share of citizens 
in private jobs is less than half as high. The daʿm’s impact was slowed if not reversed by 
a series of significant hikes in public sector salaries in the early 2010s, however, leading a 
considerable number of citizens to abandon private jobs for secure public sector employ-
ment again. Some Kuwaitis at the time spoke of a wave of hijra (migration) of Kuwaiti 
employees from the private to the public sector.
The daʿm al-ʿamala allowances in turn were almost doubled in early 2013, but this has 
been insufficient to completely close the public/private salary gap discussed above, which 
is compounded by the more convenient working conditions in government. As a result, 
private employment for citizens has been stagnating since the early 2010s. 
There is also evidence that not all of the Kuwaiti private employment that is supported 
by the daʿm system is genuine: reports about Kuwaiti nationals signing job contracts and 
collecting support without performing any actual work abound. This allows companies 
to fulfil official Kuwaitisation quotas while generating free (though illicit) benefits for 
citizens. In some cases, the employees are allowed to keep the (usually small) salary 
employers provide to them, while in others it is clawed back by employers. That more 
than half of daʿm recipients are female – despite a historically low labour market partic-
ipation by females in Kuwait and the wider GCC – as well as the unusually large share 
Steffen Hertog 25 
among them who receive wages just above the KD 230 per month minimum necessary to 
register for the social security system, strongly suggest that many of them are ‘phantom 
employees’.34 
This shows that the daʿm programme, while certainly helping with genuine private 
employment of Kuwaitis, has been subject to manipulation similar to other social assis-
tance programmes. And again, the political economy of wealth sharing in Kuwait, under 
which government transfers are seen as a firm entitlement for citizens, has so far pre-
vented the government from cracking down on abuse.
Fiscal Projections: Sustainability Issues
The current wealth distribution system is inefficient and unequitable, but perhaps a rich 
country like Kuwait can afford this? While this might have been the case historically, the 
sustainability of the system is increasingly in question. Already now, current spending on 
salaries and transfers dominates total government expenditure, crowding out develop-
ment spending on infrastructure and projects. Figure 7 shows that government transfers 
to the PIFSS alone in some years have been larger than government net capital expendi-
ture, while the cost of salaries is more than twice as large and has been trending upwards 
rapidly, more than doubling in the last decade and significantly growing its share in total 
expenditure since 2007/08 (Figure 8).
The subsidies item has dropped somewhat in recent years, but this is merely due to 
decreases in international energy prices, which reduce the estimated opportunity costs 
of providing cheap domestic energy. As we have seen above, water and electricity con-
sumption has doubled in less than two decades, reflecting a growth path that could soon 
become unsustainable.35
34   MGRP data from 2011 furthermore show that a disproportionate number of females with intermediate 
education who are above 30 years of age receive wage subsidies – a category of females that evinces a 
much lower labour force participation rate in other GCC countries where no wage subsidies are avail-
able. 
35   The IMF’s as well as the government’s own subsidy estimates also appear low; using average interna-
tional product prices for fuel, water and electricity to estimate lost income produces numbers that are 
about 50 percent higher; see footnote 81 in the UCG scenario section below.
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Figure 7: Government Expenditure, 2007/08 to 2018/19 (KD billion)
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Figure 8: Share of Expenditure Items in Total Government Spending, 2007/08 to 
2018/19
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The total share of salaries, subsidies and transfers in Kuwaiti government expenditure 
reached an estimated 61.3 percent in 2018/19, a very high proportion by international 
comparison – and four times as much as capital expenditure. Interviews also indicate 
that some of the 15–16% of capital expenditure is not investment in productive infra-
structure but rather expenditure on ministerial buildings, the growth of which is mostly 
a function of inflated public employment, hence not contributing to the productivity of 
the national economy.
The data also shows that government salaries are by far the largest individual item, more 
significant than either social spending or subsidies and on the most unsustainable growth 
path. Any meaningful reform of the Kuwaiti wealth distribution system will therefore have 
to put salaries at its centre.
While the composition of government expenditure is increasingly skewed, it could still be 
sustainable in accounting terms. Figure 9 shows, however, that the considerable fiscal sur-
pluses of the mid-2010s (blue bars) have almost entirely disappeared with recent declines 
in the oil price.
Figure 9: Total Government Expenditure and Net Lending/Borrowing, 2007/08 to 
2018/19 (KD billion)
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Given recent trends, and unless oil prices recover considerably, a continuation of the 
wealth sharing trends of recent years could soon push Kuwait into significant fiscal defi-
cits. This is both because the citizen population continues to grow by at least 2 percent 
per year and because per capita spending has been trending up, accelerated by occa-
sional political and economic shocks like temporary oil price increases, which incentivise 
spending increases that are hard or impossible to reverse. And while birth rates have been 
dropping, the growth of the working-age citizen population will remain high for many 
years to come; the current cohort of five- to nine- year-olds who will enter the labour 
market in ten years and after numbers 159,000 citizens, a full 25 percent more than the 
cohort of 15–19-year-olds who are just about to enter and of whom there are only 127,000 
(see 2019 CSB population estimates).36
Figure 10 shows the development of government expenditure and deficits under a ‘busi-
ness as usual’ scenario, based on IMF forecasts until 2024 and our own extrapolation of 
fiscal trends after that. Under this scenario – which includes fairly optimistic assumptions 
of increasing investment and oil income in the coming years – a deficit would appear after 
the mid-2020s and escalate soon afterwards.
Figure 10: Forecast Expenditure and Deficit Trends under Business as Usual, 
2007/08 to 2033/34
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36   ‘Population Statistics’, CBS. Available at https://www.csb.gov.kw/Pages/Statistics_en?ID=67&Parent-
CatID=%201 (accessed 4 March 2020).
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The above estimate does not count payments into the Future Generations Fund (FGF) 
as expenditure. Given the legal requirement to transfer at least 10 percent of the gov-
ernment’s income to the FGF on an annual basis, a tight fiscal situation will, in fact, 
occur earlier: Moody’s estimates that the General Reserve Fund, which is used as a 
short-term fiscal balancing tool, could be depleted as early as the 2021–22 fiscal year. 
After this, Kuwait would have to incur significant debt above the current debt ceiling or 
– more problematically – tap the FGF.37 Already now, Kuwait incurs significant deficits – 
between KD 2 billion and 6 billion/year since 2015/16 – if money transferred to the FGF 
and reinvested investment income are not included in state revenue.
The above means that the wealth distribution system that drives Kuwaiti fiscal trends is 
not only inefficient but also unsustainable. There is an urgent need to shock-proof the 
Kuwaiti fiscal system by reforming its wealth distribution policies. Avoiding the near-auto-
matic escalation of expenditure through energy subsidies and government employment is 
of particular importance. This needs to happen soon, as adjustment will be politically more 
difficult once significant deficits are incurred: resources for compensating the losers from 
reform and financing the temporary extra costs of transitioning to a new system will not 
be available then, leading to zero-sum conflict that could prevent any meaningful reform.
Summary
To sum up, the Kuwaiti government shares wealth with its citizenry in an exceptionally 
generous way, thereby sustaining a large national middle class. Unconventional wealth 
sharing policies through the provision of cheap energy and, most of all, very generous 
government employment is the dominant policy and its costs are orders of magnitude 
larger than those of conventional social safety and security. That said, conventional social 
welfare policies are also unusually generous, even by regional GCC standards.
Almost all current forms of wealth sharing are distortive of economic incentives and 
typically benefit richer households more than poorer ones. Social assistance in partic-
ular is rather complex, its purpose is not always clear and there is limited monitoring 
and follow-up capacity, which in some cases invites manipulation and abuse. The partial 
success of some wealth distribution policies – like the daʿm system’s initial ability to draw 
Kuwaitis into the private sector – has often been offset by expansion of wealth distribution 
in other areas, such as government employment.
The system is not only distortive and inefficient, but also fiscally unsustainable. Depend-
ing on which metric is used, a ‘business as usual’ scenario of expenditure will lead to 
significant fiscal stresses by the early to mid-2020s.
The material interests of the Kuwaiti middle class are well organised through parliament 
and other political channels, leading to an inability to consolidate spending policies or 
crack down on abuse. The only politically feasible reform is arguably one that does not 
cut wealth distribution in the first instance, but consolidates it into a fairer, less distortive 
(and less easily manipulated) system. Such reform options will be discussed in the 
rest of this paper.
37   Sarmad Khan, ‘Kuwait’s Sovereign Wealth Fund Assets Grow Despite Oil Price Volatility’, NBusiness, 
29 May 2019. Available at https://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/kuwait-s-sovereign-wealth-
fund-assets-grow-despite-oil-price-volatility-1.867600 (accessed 21 February 2020).
30 Reforming Wealth Distribution in Kuwait: Estimating Costs and Impacts
Alternative Wealth Sharing Mechanisms: Conceptual 
Debate
It is clear that the current wealth distribution system in Kuwait is distortive and not sus-
tainable in the long run. The following section will discuss conceptually how wealth 
should ideally be shared to minimise economic distortions and maximise inclusion, 
fairness, transparency and fiscal sustainability. The key focus will be unconditional cash 
grants (UCGs) as a substitute for energy subsidies and surplus employment in the public 
sector. Kuwait (like other GCC economies) offers a unique opportunity for introducing a 
cash grant system. Unlike in non-oil economies, the grants could be financed purely out of 
reforms of existing wealth sharing mechanisms, would not require any new taxation and 
would drastically improve economic incentives for citizens to become active in the private 
economy while safeguarding their material welfare. While the key focus is on reducing 
energy subsidies and excess public employment, the paper will also discuss how a cash 
grant system could facilitate the reforms of other social safety and security mechanisms.
Unconditional Cash Grants
UCGs (or ‘universal basic income’) are a welfare policy option that has been increasingly 
widely debated in both advanced and developing economies.38 At the same time, the dis-
cussion around such cash grants in high-rent economies like Kuwait is still in its infancy, 
although they offer a uniquely propitious environment for their introduction.
In the Kuwaiti case, the basic policy idea would be to gradually replace energy subsi-
dies and excess public employment with a regular UCG for all adult citizens who are 
not already employed in government, and a proportionally smaller grant for underage 
citizens.39 Its introduction should be combined with a clear political signal that, in the 
future, the government would provide basic welfare for citizens through the UCG mecha-
nism and would stop hiring citizens more or less indiscriminately, but only hire selectively 
in line with its actual functional needs. The separation of public employment from rent 
distribution would facilitate government recruitment that is purely needs-based, merito-
cratic and more selective, resulting in greatly reduced intake numbers.
A UCG would be a more incentive-neutral, transparent, fair and efficient way of sharing 
the nation’s wealth, while acting as potent political justification for increasing domestic 
energy prices and reducing public sector recruitment. It would allow nationals to ‘top 
38   Philippe Van Parijs, ‘Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the 21st Century’, presented at the 
Basic Income European Network VIIIth International Congress, Berlin, 2000; Philippe Van Parijs and 
Yannick Vanderborght, ‘Basic Income in a Globalized Economy’, in Brigid Reynolds and Seán Healy 
(eds), Does the European Social Model Have a Future? (Dublin: Social Justice Ireland, 2012), pp. 31–60; 
Karl Widerquist and Michael A. Lewis, The Basic Income Guarantee and the Goals of Equality, Efficiency, 
and Environmentalism (New York: Bepress, 2009). Available at http://works.bepress.com/widerquist/17 
(accessed 21 February 2020); Paul Segal, ‘Resource Rents, Redistribution, and Halving Global Poverty: 
The Resource Dividend’, World Development 39/4 (April 2011), pp. 475–89.
39   See Hertog, ‘Rent Distribution’, for a detailed case for a UCG in high-rent countries.
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up’ modest private sector earnings so as to reach an acceptable overall income, without 
creating the disincentives to work that means-tested social security provisions create, 
under which benefits are lost once individuals generate their own earnings (the so-called 
‘welfare trap’).40
A UCG would hence allow citizens to compete more effectively with migrant labour 
and, due to the basic security it provides, enable citizens to upgrade their skills and take 
risks as entrepreneurs. The larger number of citizens that would be active in the private 
economy would create a political constituency for private-driven growth. Reduced 
energy subsidies for their part would incentivise the private sector to invest in technol-
ogy-intensive production rather than low-tech, energy-intensive structures – especially 
if government supported such technology acquisition. This, together with the larger 
availability of qualified national labour, would push private business towards the much-
vaunted ‘knowledge economy’.
A UCG would be financed through subsidy reductions, reduced public sector hiring and, 
in the long run, potentially a permanent dividend on Kuwait’s overseas investments. It 
would create none of the fiscal trade-offs, economic disincentives and moral problems 
that bedevil the basic income concept in tax-based economies, where the discussion 
about UCGs originated.41 Given that current wealth sharing mechanisms have been identi-
fied as mostly regressive, a flat rate UCG for all citizens outside of the public sector would 
have a progressive income distribution effect.
The delinking of public employment and rent distribution would make wealth sharing 
broader, less exclusive, less discretionary and much less distortionary in term of labour 
market incentives. With UCGs, citizens would not have to take on idle, often unreward-
ing government jobs to share in the country’s wealth but would be free to pursue their 
own preferences, including on the private labour market. Although the size of the private 
employment effect would depend on grant level as well as prevailing private wage levels, 
it is clear that with prospects of an easy public job more remote, at least some citizens 
would seek other sources of work income.
40   On work incentive effects of UCGs, and a general review of relevant literature, see Ugo Colombino, 
‘Is Unconditional Basic Income a Viable Alternative to Other Social Welfare Measures?’, IZA World of 
Labor (2019), art. 128.
41   A detailed discussion of counter-arguments is contained in Hertog, ‘Rent Distribution’, which also 
compares UCGs to alternative, means-tested welfare mechanisms.
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Relevant Literature on Resource-Rich Countries
The case for direct cash grants has been made in some detail for lower-income resource-
rich countries, showing that compared to regressive energy subsidy systems they are more 
equitable,42 less distortive of consumption decisions and more transparent.43 Compared to 
means-tested support systems, they are easier to administer, generate smaller overheads 
and are less prone to stigmatisation and errors of exclusion.44
Cash grants could impart a sense of ownership in citizens, increasing their ‘buy in’ into 
the political system,45 and creating both a constituency for sound natural resource man-
agement and a more level playing field between state and citizens.46 Pressures for fiscal 
transparency and accountability would increase.47
By providing a secure revenue stream to citizens, cash grants could boost private invest-
ment and entrepreneurship.48 Authors in the wider literature on cash grants have adduced 
considerable evidence that private agents are adept at investing their money well.49 Devara-
jan et al. have developed a model that shows the superiority of direct dividend transfers in 
resource-rich countries over ways for governments to use the revenues.50 
Practical Experiences with Cash Grants in Non-Rentier Countries
While UCGs are yet to be trialled on a large, longer-term scale in rich countries, there is 
already a wide range of research about the practical impacts of cash grants (both conditional 
42   Martin E. Sandbu, ‘Natural Wealth Accounts: A Proposal for Alleviating the Natural Resource Curse’, 
World Development 34/7 (July 2006), pp. 1153–70.
43   Todd J. Moss, ‘Oil to Cash: Fighting the Resource Curse Through Cash Transfers’, Social Science 
Research Network (Rochester, NY, 4 January 2010). Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1824605 
(accessed 21 February 2020).
44   Segal, ‘Resource Rents’.
45   Thomas Palley, ‘Combating the Natural Resource Curse with Citizen Revenue Distribution Funds: Oil 
and the Case of Iraq’, Institute for Policy Studies (Washington, DC, December 2003).
46   Alan Gelb and Sina Grasmann, ‘How Should Oil Exporters Spend Their Rents?’, Social Science 
Research Network (Rochester, NY, 10 August 2010). Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1660570 
(accessed 21 February 2020); Alexandra Gillies, ‘Giving Money Away? The Politics of Direct Distribution 
in Resource Rich States’, Social Science Research Network (Rochester, NY, 11 November 2010). Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1824444 (accessed 21 February 2020).
47   Sandbu, ‘Natural Wealth Accounts’; Segal, ‘Resource Rents’.
48   Gelb and Grasmann, ‘How Should Oil Exporters Spend Their Rents?’; Palley, ‘Combating the Natural 
Resource Curse’; Sandbu, ‘Natural Wealth Accounts’.
49   Nancy Birdsall and Arvind Subramanian, ‘Saving Iraq From Its Oil’, Foreign Affairs, 1 July 2004. Available 
at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59923/nancy-birdsall-and-arvind-subramanian/saving-iraq-
from-its-oil (accessed 21 February 2020); Alan Gelb and Stephanie Majerowicz, ‘Oil for Uganda – or 
Ugandans? Can Cash Transfers Prevent the Resource Curse?’, Center for Global Development (Washing-
ton, DC, July 2012); Chang-Tai Hsieh, ‘Do Consumers React to Anticipated Income Changes? Evidence 
from the Alaska Permanent Fund’, American Economic Review 93/1 (2003), pp. 397–405; Sandbu, ‘Natural 
Wealth Accounts’.
50   Shanta Devarajan and Marcelo Giugale with Helène Ehrhart, Tuan Minh Le and Huong Mai Nguyen, 
‘The Case for Direct Transfers of Resource Revenues in Africa’, Center for Global Development (Washing-
ton, DC, 2013).
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and unconditional) in the developing world. An experiment with unconditional grants in 
Kenya has shown a strong consumption response to transfers, thereby benefiting both 
household welfare and the local private sector; large increases in psychological well-being; 
and higher spending on durables, helping to overcome savings and credit constraints.51
Cash transfers in the developing world generally lead to higher household expenditure 
and an increase in productive household investment, even if this is not generally a policy 
objective of transfer programmes. Effects on labour supply (which could decrease due 
to the availability of non-wage income) are either absent or very small.52 On the basis of 
seven randomised control trials of cash transfer programmes in six countries (Honduras, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua and the Philippines), a team of economists found 
no evidence that cash transfers have impacts on either the propensity to work or the 
overall number of hours worked.53 The literature also shows that if transfers are to have a 
bigger and sustainable impact, they should be provided for longer periods of time.54
Impact evaluations also show that beneficiaries of cash transfer programmes are more 
likely to save, as demonstrated by Ghana’s Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty 
(LEAP), Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Programme and Zambia’s Child Grant Program.55 The 
experience in developing countries also indicates that categorical programmes that are 
not universal can lead to errors of exclusion56 – another argument for making basic cash 
grants unconditional.
There is significant regional experience with energy subsidy reforms that are accompanied 
by cash grant policies which compensate households for the higher costs. The Jordanian 
reform of energy subsidies in 2012, for example, introduced a large-scale cash transfer 
programme to households earning less than JOD 10,000 a year, covering about two-
thirds of all Jordanian households,57 thereby generating political support for the reform 
while substantially increasing energy efficiency. Converting subsidies into less distortive 
welfare tools is a standard recommendation in international literature and an approach 
51   Johannes Haushofer and Jeremy Shapiro, ‘The Short-Term Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers to 
the Poor: Experimental Evidence from Kenya’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 131/4 (2016), pp. 1973–2042. 
52   Francesca Bastagli, Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Luke Harman, Georgina Sturge, Valentina Barca, Tanja 
Schmidt and Luca Pellerano, ‘Cash Transfers: What Does the Evidence Say? A Rigorous Review of Pro-
gramme Impact and of the Role of Design and Implementation Features’, Overseas Development Institute 
(London, 2016). On labour supply responses, see also Independent Evaluation Group, ‘Social Safety 
Nets and Gender: Learning from Impact Evaluations and World Bank Projects’, World Bank (Washing-
ton, DC, 2014).
53   Abhijit V. Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Gabriel E. Kreindler and Benjamin A. Olken, ‘Debunking the Stereo-
type of the Lazy Welfare Recipient: Evidence from Cash Transfer Programs’, The World Bank Research 
Observer 32/2 (2017), pp. 155–84.
54   Bastagli et al., ‘Cash Transfers’.
55   Ibid.
56   Marito Garcia and Chairy M. T. Moore, ‘The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs’, 
World Bank (Washington, DC, 2012).
57   Aziz Atamanov, Jon Robbert Jellema and Umar Serajuddin, ‘Energy Subsidies Reform in Jordan: 
Welfare Implications of Different Scenarios’, World Bank (Washington, DC, 2015).
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that numerous countries have practised already.58 The Kuwaiti context provides unique 
opportunities in this regard as the energy subsidies per citizen are unusually high.
There is also some experience with cash grants in developed countries that are closer to 
Kuwait in terms of GDP per capita, although the number of policy experiments conducted 
in such contexts is much smaller. One oft-cited set of trials involved negative income taxes 
provided to select US citizens in the 1970s. Negative income taxes are not quite the same 
as a UCG, as their financial benefits disappear with larger non-benefit income, therefore 
creating larger work disincentives. Even under these conditions, however, the observed 
reduction in labour efforts was only marginal.59 More recently, Finland has experimented 
with a two-year unconditional cash benefit for a subset of unemployed citizens. The 
recipients reported higher levels of happiness and health than a control group that did not 
receive the benefits, while there was no clear impact on employment (probably because 
other unemployed Finns are required to participate in active labour market programmes 
and can lose their benefits if they don’t).60
The policy context of both developing and advanced countries is rather different from 
the Kuwaiti one. Yet the positive behavioural response to cash grants in a wide variety of 
settings is encouraging, including the responsible use of newly available resources and 
the fact that additional income does little to reduce labour supply. In the Kuwaiti context, 
of course, UCGs would replace other types of wealth transfer that create much stronger 
incentives against private sector work, including public sector employment and social 
assistance grants, so are more likely to create a positive labour market response.
Experience in Resource-Rich Countries
There are two resource-rich economies in which UCGs have been deployed on a national 
scale, although on fairly low levels: first, Iran introduced unconditional household cash 
grants as compensation for higher energy prices from 2010 on. Although the programme 
has met some elite-level political resistance, popular opposition has been limited, not least 
because, unlike means-tested welfare schemes, the programme included all citizens.61 Sim-
ilarly, Alaska has been sharing parts of its reinvested oil revenue on an annual basis with all 
of its residents since 1982. In 2018, the annual grant to each man, woman and child meeting 
58   Shanta Devarajan, Lili Mottaghi, Farrukh Iqbal, Gabriela Mundaca, Maria Laursen, Maria Vagliasindi, 
Simon Commander and Isabelle Chaal-Dabi, ‘MENA Economic Monitor: Corrosive Subsidies’, World 
Bank (Washington, DC, 2014); ‘Case Studies on Energy Subsidy Reform’, IMF.
59   Philip K. Robins, ‘A Comparison of the Labor Supply Findings from the Four Negative Income Tax 
Experiments’, The Journal of Human Resources 20/4 (1985), pp. 567–82.
60   Olli Kangas, Signe Jauhiainen, Miska Simanainen and Minna Ylikännö, ‘The Basic Income Exper-
iment 2017–2018 in Finland: Preliminary Results’, Reports and Memorandums of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health 9 (Helsinki, 2019).
61   El-Katiri and Fattouh, ‘Brief Political Economy of Energy Subsidies’; ‘Case Studies on Energy Subsidy 
Reform’, IMF,  p. 30.; Hamid Tabatabai, ‘The “Basic Income” Road to Reforming Iran’s Subsidy System’, 
presented at the 13th International Congress of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Universidade 
de São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil, 2010. It is somewhat different from the citizens’ income proposed here 
as the Iranian grants are paid to heads of household rather than individuals.
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the residency requirement reached $1,600. The policy has been highly popular, but the 
level of the grant is relatively low, making a precise economic impact assessment difficult.62
The economy that comes closest to the Kuwaiti one that has some experience with 
converting subsidies to cash grants is Saudi Arabia: starting in January 2018, the Saudi 
government provides a means-tested, household-based benefit that compensates lower-
to-mid-income households for higher energy prices and the introduction of value-added 
tax. In December 2017, more than 3.7 million households had registered, representing 13 
million people, more than half the citizen population. Benefits reach up to SAR 938 /month 
(KD 76) per household. The system, while initially creating some negative social media 
reaction, is now widely accepted and has created significant fiscal savings for the Saudi 
government, while also reversing the growth of domestic energy consumption in 2018.63
While the Saudi reform is partial and the sums provided are far below what would be 
required to guarantee the basic material welfare of citizen households, the Saudi example 
shows that it is possible in principle to convert subsidies to cash grants in the GCC too – a 
policy that by now has become a standard recommendation for countries with controlled 
domestic energy prices.64
Counter-Arguments
There are a number of arguments against UCGs, mostly coming from the debate around 
UCGs in advanced countries. None of them applies in the Kuwaiti context.
The most prominent arguments against ‘basic income’ schemes relate to tax rates, labour 
market incentives and redistribution.65 A basic income in the West, as well as in lower-rent 
countries under at least some proposals,66 would require significantly higher tax rates on 
middle to high earners.67 In Kuwait, by contrast, the basic challenge is not how to raise 
revenue and from whom, but rather how to distribute the existing rent that accrues from 
outside of the local economy.68 A UCG in Kuwait would be financed by a restructuring of 
wealth distribution, not taxes.
62   Karl Widerquist and Michael Howard (eds), Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining Its Suitabil-
ity as a Model (New York: Springer, 2012).
63   Rania El Gamal and Stanley Carvalho, ‘Saudi Arabia Sees Domestic Energy Use Falling, Plans Renew-
ables Push’, Reuters, 15 January 2019. Available at https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-energy-reforms/
saudi-arabia-sees-domestic-energy-use-falling-plans-renewables-push-idUKKCN1P918N (accessed 21 
February 2020).
64   ‘Case Studies on Energy Subsidy Reform’, IMF.
65   For an overview, see Van Parijs, ‘Basic Income’.
66   Sandbu, ‘Natural Wealth Accounts’; Segal, ‘Resource Rents’.
67   Philippe Van Parijs and Claudio Salinas, ‘Basic Income and Its Cognates: Puzzling Equivalence and 
Unheeded Differences Between Alternative Ways of Addressing the “New Social Question”’, Basic 
Income Europe Network (Louvain, 1998).
68   Paul Segal, ‘How to Spend It: Resource Wealth and the Distribution of Resource Rents’, Energy Policy 
51 (December 2012), pp. 340–8.
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A tax-financed citizens’ income in a system with progressive taxation would potentially 
decrease work incentives for mid- and high earners.69 A basic income implies a ‘princi-
pled though partial disconnection between labour and income’.70 This again is not the 
case in Kuwait, at least as far as productive work is concerned: as we have argued above, 
a well-designed citizens’ income would in fact substantially increase private sector work 
incentives for nationals compared to the status quo that relies on public jobs.
Closely related, the moral argument that a citizens’ income creates a system of free-rid-
ers clinging to the coat-tails of taxpayers does not apply in the Kuwaiti scenario.71 Critics 
of basic income schemes in the West paint a gloomy picture of an army of idle or near-
idle citizens living off state-provided payments. In Kuwait, however, large-scale idleness 
already exists – including in significant parts of the public sector – and is supported in very 
inequitable ways. There would be less of it under a citizens’ income.
A citizens’ income would create what economists call an ‘income effect’, which could 
potentially reduce citizens’ desired work hours compared to a hypothetical situation 
of radical austerity under which no benefits are provided. But the latter is an extreme 
scenario that is very unrealistic in the Kuwaiti context. The question instead is which 
incentives a UCG would provide compared to the status quo. The answer is clear: if citi-
zens received a UCG but were not able to easily join the public sector, the incentive to top 
up the UCG earnings with private income would increase. Similarly, as the UCG would be 
available independent of one’s income, there would be no ‘welfare trap’ in which benefits 
are lost once an individual generates private earnings. The UCG therefore also provides 
stronger work incentives than conventional social safety policies.
Even in cases where few or no benefits are available, the work disincentive effects of uni-
versal income schemes have been shown to be small. Both US and Indian negative income 
tax and UCG experiments have shown large welfare gains accompanied by only small 
reductions in work effort,72 while most other studies on cash grants in developing coun-
tries have found no negative impact on work effort at all.
Unconditional Cash Grants and Other Benefit Policies
With a UCG, it will also become politically easier to streamline existing social assistance 
programmes, making them more targeted and outcome-oriented. Economists have shown 
that targeted programmes are, on average, 3.2 times more effective in reducing poverty 
rates than categorical programmes73 – and the effectiveness gain could be even higher in 
Kuwait, where categorical programmes disproportionately benefit richer households. 
69   Van Parijs, ‘Basic Income’; Widerquist and Lewis, Basic Income Guarantee.
70   Philippe Van Parijs, ‘Basic Income and the Two Dilemmas of the Welfare State’, The Political Quarterly 
67/1 (1996), pp. 63–6.
71   Philippe Van Parijs, ‘Free Riding versus Rent Sharing’, in Francesco Farina, Frank Hahn and Stefano 
Vannucci (eds), Ethics, Rationality and Economic Behaviour (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 159–81.
72   Colombino, ‘Is Unconditional Basic Income a Viable Alternative’.
73   Pablo Acosta, Phillipe Leite and Jamele Rigolini, ‘Should Cash Transfers Be Confined to the Poor? 
Implications for Poverty and Inequality in Latin America’, World Bank (Washington, DC, 2011).
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If basic wealth distribution happens through a separate UCG channel, it will become 
easier to introduce genuine means-testing for supplementary benefits for, say, widows, 
disabled people or orphans, and abolish categorical benefits that are of no obvious social 
use, like cash grants to women above 55 without clear income testing. Once all Kuwaitis 
are assured of a basic livelihood through UCGs, assessment of household structures and 
incomes through a real means-testing administration will become more socially accept-
able, allowing the government to build inspection and follow-up capacity, and tying social 
assistance more effectively to activation measures helping citizens out of inactivity (all 
discussed in more detail in the ‘Policy Design Options’ section below).
On the back of a UCG, it will also become easier to deploy employment subsidies in the 
private sector in a more targeted fashion. Current wage structures are such that a UCG by 
itself, unless quite generous, is likely to be insufficient to ensure that Kuwaiti citizens can 
earn a socially acceptable income through private employment. A supplementary daʿm 
system will therefore probably still be required to activate private sector employment for 
Kuwaitis. But it will become easier to crack down on ‘phantom employment’, as the UCG 
will allow the government to clearly separate legitimate wealth sharing from manipula-
tion – and everyone will be entitled to basic cash grants without having to manipulate the 
system in any way.
A UCG will also make it possible to adjust the current schedule of the daʿm system, which 
privileges degree holders over less educated citizens, although the latter face the largest 
wage cost gap relative to foreigners on the private labour market. Cuts of the daʿm pay-
ments at the top end (i.e. for degree holders) can be compensated through the universally 
received UCG.
Unconditional Cash Grant Scenarios and their 
Distributional and Economic Consequences
The following section will estimate which levels of UCG could be paid to Kuwaiti citi-
zens under a variety of assumptions. The core analysis will estimate possible UCG levels 
merely on the basis of domestic energy price reforms and the resulting savings, but we 
will also discuss the possibility of higher UCGs that could be financed through additional 
savings from gradual attrition of the public sector workforce.
The section will then analyse the distributional consequences of such reforms for house-
holds and individual citizens, drawing on 2013 household survey consumption data, the 
most recent data publicly available (data from a 2018 survey is not yet public). The analysis 
will estimate both the cost imposed by higher energy prices across different households 
of different income levels and the net income effects of UCG across different households. 
This is followed by a discussion of the likely labour market consequences of the UCG and 
the impact of higher energy prices on operational costs in the private sector, differentiated 
by subsectors.
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Assumptions 
In estimating the UCG that could be financed through energy price reforms, we take the 
IMF estimate of about KD 1.8 billion of annual energy subsidies as our point of depar-
ture (taken from the IMF’s most recent Article IV report).74 Using international price 
benchmarks, we then estimate which water and electricity price reforms would lead 
to about KD 1.8 billion of extra government revenue and how these savings could be 
redistributed to the citizen population. We do not propose further reforms to gasoline, 
diesel and kerosene prices, which are already close to (if still mostly below) interna-
tional benchmark prices.75
Tables 5 and 6 show a set of electricity and water prices which would lead to extra 
revenue of KD 1.8 billion at current consumption levels. The assumed new electricity 
price of KD 0.025 per kWh for all consumers is in line with price reforms originally pro-
posed by the government in the mid-2010s, is already paid by government consumers, 
and still lies significantly below electricity prices in developed benchmark countries 
(which lie between KD 0.033/kWh in Canada and KD 0.1/kWh in Germany).76 
The proposed new water price of KD 0.5 per m3 actually lies below the current price paid 
by government units. It is roughly on the level of average water tariffs in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe, while being less than half of prices in Western Europe or North America.77
The above is merely illustrative. In practice, a different water and electricity tariff mix 
could lead to the same extra income. It will be important, however, to keep new tariffs as 
simple as possible, justify them with relevant benchmarks and remove implicit subsidies 
as far as possible. Only if these criteria are met can these subsidies be converted to more 
efficient and incentive-neutral direct payments for citizens.
74   The IMF estimates subsidies at KD 1.5 billion in 2017–18, KD 1.9 billion in 2018/19 and KD 1.7 billion in 
2019–20. ‘Kuwait: 2019 Article IV Consultation’, p. 30.
75   The recent average wholesale spot price for gasoline and diesel in the US is $1.8 per gallon. See 
‘Diesel Daily Price’, Index Mundi. Available at https://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodi-
ty=diesel&months=60 (accessed 21 February 2020). This corresponds to about 150 fils per litre. Current 
Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) product prices for end consumers lie between 85 and 
165 fils, see ‘Petrol Stations’, KNPC. Available at https://www.knpc.com/en/our-business/petrol-stations 
(accessed 21 February 2020).
76   See ‘Global Electricity Prices in 2018, by Select Country’, Statista. Available at https://www.statista.
com/statistics/263492/electricity-prices-in-selected-countries (accessed 21 February 2020). 
77   The proposed water price of KD 0.5 per m3 is equivalent to $1.65. For comparable US dollar figures 
from different world regions, see ‘What Does the World Pay for Water?’, Water Security Solutions Centre. 
Available at https://globalwatersecurity.org/content-hub/2019-02-11/What-does-the-world-pay-for-wa-
ter (accessed 21 February 2020).
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Table 5: Electricity Prices, 2019, and Proposed New Prices (KD)
Sector Current prices/
kWh
New proposed 
price/kWh
Increase rate 
(%)
Government 0.025 0.025 0.0
Investment and commercial 0.005 0.025 400.0
Industry and agriculture 0.005 0.025 400.0
Industry and agriculture (producers) 0.003 0.025 733.0
Others (except residential) 0.012 0.025 108.3
Source: MoEW
Table 6: Water Prices, 2019, and Proposed New Prices (KD)
Sector Current water 
price per 
1,000 imperial 
gallons
New proposed 
price per m3
New proposed 
price per 
1,000 imperial 
gallons
Increase rate 
(%)
Government 4 0.5 2.273 −43.0
Investment and commercial 2 0.5 2.273 13.7
Others (except residential) 2 0.5 2.273 13.7
Industry and agriculture 1.25 0.5 2.273 81.8
Industry and agriculture 
(producers)
0.75 0.5 2.273 203.1
Source: MoEW
To estimate the additional revenue generated by the proposed new prices, we use MoEW 
statistics on current water and electricity revenue and consumption by sector. We assume 
that the revenue due from the new tariffs is fully collected. Interviews indicate that the 
collection of utility dues is currently deficient, but we argue that the introduction of a 
UCG would make it politically easier to enforce actual collection, as is already happening 
in other GCC countries.78
Figure 11 compares current MoEW revenue (for 2017) with the new revenue that would be 
generated under the new tariffs. The net gain amounts to KD 1.8 billion, about 84 percent 
of which would be generated through higher electricity prices.
78   In the case of electricity, we assume that consumption by sector is proportional to installed capacity, 
as the MoEW electricity yearbook only provides a sectoral breakdown by capacity, not consumption.
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Figure 11: Current (2017) and New Water and Electricity Revenue Compared (KD)
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It is worth pointing out that the proposed utility prices are still considerably below those 
customary in developed countries, including energy-rich ones like the US or Canada. If 
US prices are used as a benchmark for local pricing, the total extra revenue at current con-
sumption levels would amount to KD 3.27 billion, almost twice as much as under the core 
scenario used here. This would allow a correspondingly higher UCG. The proposal here 
should therefore be used as a lower boundary estimate, and authorities should consider 
more ambitious energy price reforms at least in the medium term.
Distributional and Economic Consequences for Households
The following subsection will model the welfare consequences for various types of 
Kuwaiti households if the extra revenue generated through higher utility prices is redis-
tributed to citizens via a UCG. We will consider a number of scenarios, including a flat 
UCG for all adults and – as preferred option – a UCG that is higher for adults with no 
government jobs and lower for public employees, who already receive implicit subsidies 
through their public jobs. We model the resulting income effects for households with 
different sizes, employment statuses and income levels. In all cases, the UCG has a signif-
icant progressive impact because it is paid independent of income levels, while under the 
current system poorer households benefit less from subsidies due to their lower average 
consumption levels. Despite the reform’s positive redistributive effect, there are no net 
losers, even among households where all adults are employed in the public sector.
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In a first step, we calculate the extra costs per capita that the proposed higher utility prices 
would create, assuming in the first instance that consumption levels remain unchanged. 
Unfortunately, MoEW reports do not provide a precise breakdown of consumption 
between citizens and foreign residents. We therefore use figures from a research report 
recently cited in the local press that indicates that expatriate households (apartments) 
consume 20 percent of total electricity and 22% of water, as opposed to 40% and 43% 
for private (Kuwaiti) houses (the rest is accounted for by the government and the private 
sector).79 Should more precise primary consumption data become available, our estimates 
could easily be fine-tuned.
Figure 12 shows that most adult residents in Kuwait are foreigners. The higher total water 
and electricity consumption of Kuwaitis hence implies much larger per capita consump-
tion by citizens (see Table 7).
Figure 12: Demographic Composition of Kuwait, mid-201880
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Source: CSB
79   ‘Houses Consume 40% of Energy, Apartments 20%: Houses Take 43% Water Output, Apartments 
22%’, Kuwait Times, 11 April 2016. Available at https://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/houses-consume-
40-energy-apartments-20-houses-take-43-water-output-apartments-22 (accessed 21 February 2020).
80  We count as children all individuals under 20 years of age (available demographic data is only broken 
down into five-year brackets).
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Table 7: Estimated Annual per Capita Water and Electricity Consumption by  
Nationality, 2017
Kuwaitis Foreign residents
m3 water 225.8 48.9
kWh electricity 22015.5 4767.0
Source: MoEW, own calculation
This breakdown of consumption by nationality allows us to estimate the average per 
capita utility costs for Kuwaitis and foreign residents under current tariffs (assuming bills 
are actually paid) as well the extra cost of new tariffs. Table 8 shows that the current cost 
for Kuwaitis and foreign residents is roughly the same at KD 44–5/year, mostly because 
foreigners in apartments pay considerably higher tariffs.
Table 8: Old and New Annual per Capita Costs of Water and Electricity by  
Nationality (KD)
Existing per capita cost Extra cost/year  
new tariffs, unchanged 
consumption
Extra cost/year  
if consumption drops  
by 30%
Kuwaitis Expats Kuwaitis Foreigners Kuwaitis Foreigners
Water 0 21.51 112.90 2.94 79.027 2.94
Electricity 44.03 23.83 506.36 95.34 341.24 59.59
Total 44.03 45.34 619.25 98.28 420.27 62.52
Source: Own calculations using MoEW consumption and price data
Should all households be moved to the unified higher tariffs proposed here, the extra cost 
would amount to KD 620/year per Kuwaiti and KD 98/year for foreigners if consumption 
levels do not change. Given the high current levels of inefficiency and waste it is likely, 
however, that households would in practice adjust their consumption downwards when 
facing higher prices. We have no historical data to reliably estimate the price elasticity of 
water and electricity consumption in Kuwait, but using international research on such 
elasticities,81 we cautiously assume that consumption could in the mid-term drop by an 
average of 30 percent under the new, higher prices. In that case, the extra annual cost 
per capita would on average be KD 420 per Kuwaiti and KD 62 per foreigner. In practice, 
savings could be even higher once infrastructure, technology and habits have adjusted to 
higher prices.82 
As mentioned, the higher utility prices would generate additional revenue of about KD 
1.8 billion at current consumption levels, all of which would in principle be available to 
81   Charap, Ribeiro da Silva and Rodriguez, ‘Energy Subsidies and Energy Consumption’.
82   Available literature suggests price elasticities of energy consumption of around -0.5, which would 
imply stronger consumption effects given the larger proposed increase in electricity tariffs in particular; 
ibid.
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finance UCG payments. It should be noted that a potential drop in consumption levels 
would not necessarily mean less government revenue: to the extent that electricity and 
desalinated water are generated by burning crude, fuel oil, diesel and expensively imported 
liquefied natural gas, lower household consumption would mean lower use of these forms 
of energy, meaning lower input costs and more availability of crude and related products 
for export. The precise fiscal impact of this substitution is beyond this paper, not least as 
we lack data on the precise input mix of the Kuwaiti electricity and desalination industry, 
but it is unlikely to change the UCG estimates here materially.83
How should the KD 1.8 billion be distributed among Kuwaiti citizens? A good case can be 
made that every Kuwaiti, including children, should be entitled to some payment: the idea 
of the UCG reform is to make every household at least as well off as before the reform. 
Children contribute to household consumption and a UCG limited to adults only would 
penalise households with more children. That said, consumption per child is likely to 
be considerably lower than that of adults, and the key economic rationale of the UCG 
– creating a less distortive incentive environment, including on the labour market – pri-
marily applies to adults. We therefore follow standard practice in counting a child as half 
a person for welfare purposes and accordingly apportion half the UCG of a typical adult 
for each child.84
We count Kuwaiti individuals as adults from age 20 on. This allows for more precise 
estimates due to the breakdown of available demographic data in five-year brackets, but 
also has a substantial justification: until that age, most Kuwaitis are still in education and 
almost all live with their parents. The age cut-off point can potentially be modified for 
future estimates.
Table 9 shows the UCGs that could be financed through extra utilities revenue of KD 1.8 
billion. A completely flat UCG for all citizens (including children) would reach KD 1,340 
per year – more than twice as much as the average per capita cost of the higher utility 
tariffs even if consumption remains unchanged (the net gain is mostly explained by the 
fact that private sector and foreign consumers will also pay higher water and electricity 
charges, which will contribute to the overall UCG pot that is divided among citizens).
If we set the UCG for adults at twice the level of the UCG for children, annual payments 
reach KD 1,726 and KD 863 for adults and children respectively. The reduced payment to 
children would still be considerably above the average per capita cost of higher utility prices. 
As mentioned above, a key rationale for the UCG is to provide basic income to citizens that 
is independent of either subsidies or public sector employment. This means that public 
sector employees, most of whom already receive a considerable if implicit wealth transfer 
83   According to the Minister of Electricity and Industry, Kuwait uses 350,000 barrels per day of oil 
equivalent to produce electricity and water. This amount of crude would be worth KD 2.7 billion per 
year at current prices of $65 per barrel. This implies that any reduction in domestic oil consumption due 
to lower electricity demand could generate even more income than the proposed electricity and water 
price increases, which would only yield net income of KD 1.8 billion.
84   ‘Developing a Strategic Social Safety Net Framework for Kuwait’, World Bank, p. 26.
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through their government jobs, should not be entitled to a full UCG. Instead, they should 
merely be compensated for the extra cost of higher utility prices so that they do not incur 
net losses. We therefore propose a reduced UCG of KD 720 per year for Kuwaitis employed 
in the public sector. This is KD 100 more than the average extra cost of higher utility tariffs, 
thereby guaranteeing that the majority of government employees will be slightly better 
off under the new system – especially if they have children, who would each receive the 
full child UCG of KD 863/year. The typical public employee would be likely to experience 
a small net income gain even if we consider the secondary inflation effects that higher 
energy prices could generate via private sector energy costs, and which we discuss below.
According to data from the PACI, about 45 percent of Kuwaitis aged 20 years or older are 
currently employed in the public sector. If they receive a reduced UCG of KD 720 per year, 
this liberates resources for a correspondingly higher UCG for Kuwaiti adults who are not 
government employed. Such individuals could receive a UCG of KD 2,550 per year (or KD 
212 per month), more than four times the average cost resulting from higher utility prices.
Table 9: UCG Options (KD)
Monthly Annual
UCG per Kuwaiti, flat 111.99 1343.87
UCG adults, flat 143.81 1725.75
UCG children, flat 71.91 862.87
UCG adults in government 60.00 720.00
UCG other adults 212.52 2550.22
Source: Own calculations
KD 212 per month is not enough for a comfortable life in Kuwait, but it exceeds the basic 
poverty line, estimated at KD 170 per month and person by the World Bank, so could be 
considered as a basic maintenance grant.85 For a family of two adults who are not govern-
ment employed and have two children, the monthly UCG income would amount to KD 
569. This is slightly above current levels of income maintenance paid by MoSAL to certain 
categories of beneficiaries, close to the lowest salaries available in the public sector and 
roughly the threshold for household poverty that is informally used by the General Sec-
retariat of the Supreme Council for Planning and Development. While not enough to 
guarantee a middle-class lifestyle, the availability of such income is likely to create sig-
nificant incentives to eschew public employment and potentially seek complementary 
private income through work or entrepreneurship, discussed in more detail below. We also 
go on to discuss complementary options to finance higher UCG payments (which would 
give correspondingly stronger incentives to leave government employment) through the 
gradual and voluntary erosion of public employment.
85   Ibid., p. 28.
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Modelling Redistribution Effects
The average income effects of all of the UCG options discussed above are positive, 
even for individuals employed in government receiving a reduced UCG. But what about 
income effects across different types of households with different income and consump-
tion levels? We now break down net income effects by different levels of total household 
expenditure as recorded in the 2013 household survey.86 This is motivated by three con-
cerns: first, are there any net losers from the reform if we differentiate households that 
way? Secondly, what is the redistributive (progressive) effect of shifting from regressive 
subsidies to general lump sum payments? Thirdly, given that the UCG in our preferred 
scenario is differentiated by employment status, how do the incentive effects for Kuwaitis 
inside and outside of public employment compare?
We did not manage to obtain raw data from the household survey, which forces us to use 
aggregate data broken down into a number of pre-set categories. Publicly available survey 
data categorises Kuwaiti households into six monthly expenditure categories, reaching 
from KD 450–1,049/month to KD 3,450+/month, accompanied by the average number of 
household members, which reaches from 3.9 in the poorest to 9.2 in the richest category 
(see Table 10). Published data unfortunately does not provide specific data on water and 
energy consumption data but only a broader category for ‘Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas, 
and Other Fuels’. 
To approximate the likely consumption of and expenditure on water and electricity, 
we assume that the consumption gradient for these two subcategories across different 
types of households is the same as that for the broader category. This procedure implies 
that the households in the richest category consume 2.5 times as much per capita as the 
poorest ones. We then take the average per capita increase in utility expenditure under 
the UCG scenario and weight it across different household categories in line with this 
gradient (third row in Table 10). Micro-data from the household survey could make these 
estimates much more precise and allow us to analyse household size and expenditure 
independently of each other. That said, we are confident that the below estimates are 
broadly correct.
We then proceed to estimate the net annual per capita gain (or loss) across different 
household categories by adding up UCG incomes and subtracting the estimated extra 
spending on utilities under the new prices. We do this for our preferred policy scenario 
under which public employees receive a reduced UCG of KD 720/year while adults outside 
of the public sector receive KD 2,550/year. For the sake of simplicity (and in the absence of 
more fine-grained data on household composition), we assume that each type of house-
hold contains two adults, with all other members being children. We provide estimates 
both for a scenario of unchanged consumption (middle section of Table 10) and for a 
scenario where consumption drops by 30 percent (bottom section of Table 10).
86   A new survey was conducted in 2018, but results are not yet available.
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Table 10: Per Capita Annual Net Gains under UCG by Household Expenditure Level 
(KD)
Monthly household 
expenditure
450–
1049
1050–
1649 
1650–
2249
2250–
2849
2850–
3349
3450+
Average household size 
(adults and children)
3.9 6.1 6.4 7.8 8.0 9.2
Reference: per capita extra 
cost of new utility tariffs87 
318.90 325.01 442.89 501.15 657.44 805.80
Net annual per capita income effects at 100% consumption
Two adults, none in public 
sector
1409.28 1091.10 947.28 794.38 627.27 423.89
Two adults, one in public 
sector
939.99 791.06 661.31 559.73 398.49 224.96
Two adults, both in public 
sector
470.70 491.02 375.33 325.09 169.71 26.02
Net annual per capita income effects at 70% consumption
Two adults, none in public 
sector
1511.75 1195.53 1089.59 955.41 838.53 682.82
Two adults, one in public 
sector
1042.46 895.50 803.62 720.77 609.75 483.88
Two adults, both in public 
sector
573.18 595.46 517.65 486.12 380.97 284.95
Source: Own calculations
Table 10 shows that all the types of households considered here witness net per capita 
gains. These gains are, however, considerably larger for poorer households: their net 
benefit is up to three times larger than that of households in the richest category. Similarly, 
households with no public employees have much larger per capita gains than ones with 
two public employees, again up to a factor of three. The relative and absolute gains do 
not change dramatically in the scenario with reduced consumption (they are somewhat 
stronger for richer households, as their absolute drop in per capita consumption is larger 
under the 70 percent scenario).
This means that the proposed UCG reform would fulfil all of its criteria: while there would 
be no net losers among different household categories, the reform would have a strong 
progressive effect, benefiting poorer households more and reversing the regressive impact 
of subsidies. As importantly, households with no public sector employees would derive 
significantly larger per capita benefits than those relying on government employment. 
In the poorest expenditure category, the difference in total income gains between house-
holds having two and those having no public sector employee amounts to KD 3,660/year 
87  Weighted in line with the general distribution of consumption in the ‘Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas, 
and Other Fuels’ category.
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or KD 305/month. This can give a potentially significant incentive to seek gainful employ-
ment outside of the public sector.88
We need to consider that energy price reforms and UCGs imply some extent of redis-
tribution from private sector and foreign residents to Kuwaiti citizens, as neither private 
businesses nor foreign workers would be compensated for higher utility prices. We expect 
welfare effects on foreign residents to be relatively small, however, as indicated by the 
above estimate of between KD 62 and 98 of per capita extra costs due to new tariffs. This 
is both because of lower consumption levels (especially among poorer foreigners) and 
because foreigners already pay somewhat higher prices. The poorest foreigners, that is, 
domestic and construction workers, by and large live in Kuwaiti households and worker 
camps, where they do not pay utility bills themselves. Some of the higher cost of living for 
other foreigners is likely to be recouped through (slightly) higher wage demands. 
It would be difficult to make a case that foreign residents are entitled to subsidised utility 
services, and considerably higher rates for foreigners are already a reality in neighbouring 
countries like the UAE. That said, it will be important to stringently enforce Kuwait’s exist-
ing minimum wage rules to reduce the vulnerability of low earners to higher utility prices. 
A more precise analysis of electricity and water consumption patterns among expatriate 
households, based on raw survey data, would be appropriate to assess the likely social 
impact for foreigners.
Inflation Effects
The above estimates have only considered the direct cost effect of higher utility tariffs on 
households. There could in principle be indirect inflationary effects, as the production of 
goods and services in Kuwait also involves water and electricity consumption, the cost of 
which would increase. Such effects are likely to be very small, however: according to MoEW 
data, the private sector currently only consumes 23 percent of electricity in Kuwait, and 
its share in water consumption is likely to be similar (as shown above, residents consume 
62%, with the rest divided between government and business). This means that even if 
all of the new costs of about KD 400 million incurred by private firms were passed on to 
consumers, this would only lead to an inflation shock of less than 1 percent. 
In practice, the private sector is very likely to absorb some of the cost itself, while also 
improving its energy and water efficiency, thereby reducing its gross utility expenditure 
to start with. International experience shows that energy price shocks are passed on via 
higher consumer prices only weakly.89 We therefore anticipate an inflationary impact of 
88   The difference for households with more than two adults (of which there are likely to be some, espe-
cially among richer households) is even larger. Unfortunately the aggregate survey data does not allow 
us to distinguish the composition of households by age.
89   John Peterson, ‘Economic Effects of Recent Increases in Energy Prices’, Congress of the United States, 
Congressional Budget Office (Washington, DC, 2006). For the weak secondary impacts of commodity 
price increases, see also Stephen G. Cecchetti and Richhild Moessner, ‘Commodity Prices and Infla-
tion Dynamics’, Social Science Research Network (Rochester, NY, 8 December 2008). Available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1517224 (accessed 21 February 2020).
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less than 0.5 percent, which would have a negligible impact on household welfare. At a 
0.5 percent inflation shock, even rich households spending KD 3,450 per month would 
experience a loss of annual per capita real income of only KD 22 – orders of magnitude 
below the UCG income effects discussed above. For comparison, Kuwait’s inflation rate 
hit its peak in 2008 at 10.6 percent, a level with much more significant consequences for 
real incomes.
Labour Market Incentives and Behaviour Among Kuwaitis
One key motivation for introducing a UCG would be to politically justify a reduction in 
public sector hiring while closing the income gap between the private and public sector so 
as to make private employment relatively more attractive. We lack raw labour force survey 
data that would allow us to model Kuwaitis’ labour market behaviour with any precision. 
We can, however, broadly indicate what the average income gaps are and to what extent 
the above UCG policies would close them.
Aggregate labour force survey data shows an average gap in public and private wages of 
KD 426/month for Kuwaiti males and 446/month for females. We are unable to control for 
level of education, type of work and the fact that some private sector employment is not 
genuine, so are unable to make a like-for-like comparison of wages in the two sectors. If 
we take the aggregate wage gap levels at face value, however, then the UCG scenario pro-
posed above is insufficient for closing the income gap between the sectors: the difference 
between monthly grants for public sector employees and other adult Kuwaitis is only KD 
152, less than half of the wage gap. 
That said, the proposed UCG of KD 212 could, together with the existing daʿm al-ʿamala 
system, make more private sector jobs materially attractive to Kuwaitis. We saw above 
that the vast majority of private jobs that are currently held by foreigners, 96.2 percent, 
pay KD 600 or less per month (see Figure 6). A combination of daʿm, UCG and available 
(low) wages would, however, lift many Kuwaitis into mid-income status even if they took 
low-paid private jobs. With average private sector wages for Kuwaitis of KD 1,354/month 
for males and KD 828/month for females, an income gain of KD 212/month is substantial. 
Combined with reduced availability of public sector jobs, the incentive to seek private 
employment would increase substantially.
New entrants to the labour market could still complain that even with a UCG, they would 
not quite reach the income levels of previous cohorts that were able to join the public 
sector. To address this concern, the government should consider topping up the UCG in 
line with anticipated exit rates from the public sector. As mentioned above, the availabil-
ity of a higher UCG would incentivise at least some public employees to leave the public 
sector. The savings generated this way could be partially or completely redirected towards 
UCG payments for adults who are not on the public payroll. This would create a self-rein-
forcing mechanism: a higher UCG would incentivise more incumbent public employees 
to leave, thereby creating larger savings that can finance the higher UCG. 
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Unfortunately we do not have sufficient data to assess the likely exit rates from the public 
sector under different UCG scenarios. Anecdotally, it appears that female public employ-
ees in particular might be willing to give up their public jobs in return for a UCG (without 
necessarily joining the private labour force) – but the effect is impossible to quantify. 
We therefore strongly recommend the commissioning of surveys among current public 
employees to gauge their willingness to leave the public sector under different UCG sce-
narios. This could then be used to identify feasible UCG levels that would both slim the 
public sector and generate sufficient savings to finance the accompanying cash grants. 
The quantitative estimates of the present paper focus mostly on the baseline UCG that can 
be generated through subsidy reforms, as these scenarios are more tractable with available 
data. As the section below on the longer-term fiscal impact of UCG reform shows, however, 
it would be possible to easily finance a KD 200 top-up to the UCG for adults outside of the 
public sector through a reduction in public employment of about 10 percent – or by simply 
halting the current trend of public sector payroll increases for about two years. With the 
KD 200 top-up, the total UCG would roughly bridge the current income gap between pub-
licly and privately employed Kuwaitis. This would equalise average income incentives in 
the public and private sectors, which should be the ultimate target of any comprehensive 
wealth distribution reform. It would also provide an income stream that is much closer to 
the basic needs of Kuwaiti citizens. The long-term budgetary implications of the basic and 
the augmented UCG are discussed in the fiscal section below.
The new incentive environment provided by the UCG would generate broader, medi-
um-term structural effects on productivity and entrepreneurship among Kuwaitis. As 
government employment would not be easily available, citizens would have stronger 
incentives to acquire skills relevant for the private sector and to start their own businesses. 
These effects are difficult to quantify but are likely to be substantive, given how many 
Kuwaitis are currently ‘parked’ in the civil service at low activity and productivity levels.
Consequences for Businesses
Above, we have assessed the welfare consequences of higher energy prices for households. 
Higher energy prices will also have consequences for businesses, which also consume 
water and electricity. As mentioned, some of this might be passed on to consumers in the 
shape of higher prices, although the impact of this would be quite small. But what about 
costs that are not passed on to consumers – is there a risk that Kuwaiti firms’ profitability 
would suffer significantly? The following subsection uses aggregate data establishment 
surveys in key sectors to estimate the impact of higher energy costs on business opera-
tions. We focus on industry, construction, retail and other services, thereby covering all 
major services with significant energy inputs. We did not have access to raw survey data, 
which means that our estimates focus on general averages as we lacked information on 
the distribution of energy consumption or profit margins within sectors.
Establishment surveys provide sectoral figures on utility consumption, gross value added 
(GVA) and gross inputs. We use these to calculate the costs of more expensive electricity 
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and water as a share of both GVA and gross inputs by sector. We use GVA as the closest 
available approximation of profit.90 We assume no price elasticity of consumption, that 
is, that firms do not reduce their water and electricity inputs as prices rise. This way, we 
obtain an upper boundary estimate for the actual costs, because in practice firms are likely 
to seek efficiencies in the face of higher prices. We also assume that firms’ current expen-
diture on water and electricity prices reflects the full payment of utility bills under current 
prices, that is, there are no significant payment defaults. This might not always be the case 
for smaller firms, but the published establishment survey data provides no information on 
consumption in terms of litres or kWh that would allow a more precise estimate.
Figure 13 shows the current and future shares of electricity and water expenditure in 
inputs and GVA for industry. While the new tariffs would considerably increase such costs 
in proportional terms, they would remain very low (less than 2 percent) as a share of total 
costs and value added. We can therefore conclude that the material impact on industry 
would be very small.
Figure 13: Current and Estimated Future Electricity and Water Costs: Industry, 2016
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Source: Based on 2016 establishment survey data
The share of utility costs varies significantly by subsector, with some forms of production 
incurring higher energy costs under the new tariffs. They reach 12.5 percent of GVA in the 
90   We assumed that the current cost of electricity for active industrial and commercial consumers is 3 
fils per kWh. Cost increases would be lower for companies paying 5 fils per kWh (which are considered 
inactive by government). Public and private industry are combined in our estimates, as the available 
survey data provides no breakdown by ownership.
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case of tanning and dressing of leather, 9.1% for refined petroleum products, 8.8% for wood 
products, 8.4% for apparel and 7.9% for fabricated metal. All these are fairly low shares and, 
with the exception of refining, the sectors are quite small in the Kuwaiti context.
The cost effects for the other sectors under study – construction, retail and other ser-
vices – are similarly manageable (Figures 14–16). The somewhat higher impact on retail is 
mostly due to higher electricity prices, leading to an estimated reduction of GVA by about 
4.4 percent. In practice, operational adjustments to lower electricity costs should be fairly 
straightforward, for example by using energy-efficient LED lighting, more efficient insula-
tion for buildings and more efficient air conditioning systems.
Figure 14: Current and Estimated Future Electricity and Water Costs: Construction, 
2016
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Figure 15: Current and Estimated Future Electricity and Water Costs: Retail, 2014
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Figure 16: Current and Estimated Future Electricity and Water Costs: Other  
Services, 2016
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Many sectors, including construction and ‘other services’, currently have considerably 
higher expenditure on fuels than on electricity and water, reflecting past increases in gas-
oline and diesel prices. It is worth noting that they by and large absorbed these past price 
increases without suffering significantly. 
In sum, the impact of higher (if still quite affordable) water and electricity tariffs on 
Kuwaiti business would be limited even if we assume that they cannot pass on any of 
the cost to consumers and are unable to find any efficiencies in their current use of such 
utilities. That said, a closer study of the effects based on raw establishment survey data 
would be advisable. Should individual subsectors be exposed to an unusually high cost 
impact, the government could consider temporary financial and/or technical assistance 
to such firms for retooling their operations to become more energy efficient. This could 
be considered particularly for export competing, energy-intensive sectors that operate in 
international markets. The share of such firms in total production is so small, however, 
that the cost of such programmes would be immaterial in the context of the larger fiscal 
implications of the proposed UCG policy.
What is arguably more important is that the UCG policy is likely to have a countervail-
ing positive effect on industries serving domestic consumers that would be larger than 
the direct cost effect. We have shown that most households would derive significant net 
income gains from the UCG policy. Assuming that some of the extra income will be spent 
on goods and services locally, this will give the private sector a considerable boost. 
We assume that Kuwaiti households spend 75 percent of their income, the ‘propensity 
to consume’ ratio suggested by the household survey across different income groups. At 
an average net per capita income gain of KD 721 in the case of unchanged energy con-
sumption, this would imply extra consumer spending of KD 720 million per year. Should 
households reduce energy consumption by 30 percent under higher prices, the average 
net income gain would amount to KD 920 per capita, leading to KD 920 million of extra 
consumption spending. The latter figure is more than 2 percent of Kuwaiti GDP, a poten-
tially considerable boost for the local economy that would far outweigh any cost effects 
of energy reforms for business. 
The above assumes no other effects of the UCG on household incomes. In practice, there 
would probably be indirect effects as the UCG would allow some consolidation of social 
safety spending (see below) which would somewhat reduce consumption effects. To the 
extent that the UCG incentivises public employees to leave government, this would also 
have consumption effects: potentially positive ones if they sought private income that is 
subsidised through daʿm and UCG, but potentially negative ones if they chose to remain 
inactive and only draw on the UCG instead of their public salaries. Such effects are too 
indirect to estimate, but their magnitude is likely to be secondary to the immediate con-
sumption effect of the UCG reform. But even if a reduction in the public payroll should 
have a contractionary impact on private consumption, it should be noted that such a 
reduction is strictly necessary for reasons of fiscal sustainability. The UCG policy would 
contribute much to dampening the contractionary effects of reducing public employment.
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Policy Design Options
This paper cannot offer a full and detailed implementation package for UCG and social 
safety reform. It can, however, offer an overview of key policy design choices that will have 
to be made.
UCG Options
There are a number of administrative choices that will have to be made about the UCG 
beyond determining how it is financed and setting its level. First of all, the government 
will need to decide how quickly to transition into the UCG. This will mostly boil down to 
deciding how quickly and comprehensively energy subsidies are to be phased out. A ‘big 
bang’ option under which both the new tariffs and the full UCG financed through them 
are immediately introduced seems preferable. As we have seen, the negative impact of 
the new tariffs on the private sector will be limited, reducing the need for a phased intro-
duction. Conversely, a gradualist approach creates the risk of organised resistance from 
the small minority of energy consumers that might be (or think they will be) negatively 
affected. There is precedent for a successful one-off price adjustment without compensa-
tion in the increase in gasoline and diesel prices in September 2016. 
Some Kuwaiti economists have in the past argued for a multi-tier tariff, under which 
water and electricity prices rise with consumption levels. While such an approach makes 
sense to protect the welfare of smaller (and poorer) consumers in cases where no other 
compensation is provided, there is no clear rationale for such tariff differentiation under 
the UCG scenario. A unified tariff that reflects opportunity costs of production is prefer-
able because it maximises revenue and provides incentives to consume efficiently at any 
level of consumption, rather than giving away some electricity and water cheaply.
While the UCG can be financed through utility reforms and potential shrinkage of the 
public payroll in the short to medium term, questions remain about its long-term financ-
ing: assuming that in the long run oil income will drop and potentially disappear, the 
responsibility for financing citizen cash grants could gradually transition to Kuwait’s 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), notably the FGF. The FGF has been set up precisely to 
safeguard the welfare of future generations of Kuwaitis once hydrocarbons revenues dis-
appear and a UCG would be an ideal vehicle to share overseas investment wealth in a 
fair, transparent and sustainable fashion with the country’s citizens. Precise financial esti-
mates for transitioning to an SWF-financed UCG are beyond the scope of this paper, but 
we can note that the investment returns registered by the Kuwaiti government in 2018/19 
amounted to KD 5.5 billion (and are projected to slightly increase in future years). This 
compares favourably to the cost of the baseline UCG in this paper of KD 1.8 billion, as 
well as to the KD 2.8 billion annual cost in case additional KD 200/month payments are 
provided to adults outside of the government sector.
The government will also need to decide whether UCG payments will be provided to 
individuals or heads of households. Given MoSAL’s current difficulty in determining indi-
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viduals’ exact household status, a simple system under which payments are provided to 
all adults directly (and no adjustment to UCG levels is made in line with personal status 
etc.) is preferable. The reduced UCG for children could be provided to mothers, given 
that they in practice tend to be responsible for expenditure affecting their children.
The potential availability of an augmented UCG of more than KD 400/month raises the 
problem that salaries at the bottom end of the public sector scale might not be attrac-
tive enough to retain any Kuwaiti citizens in low-skilled jobs. According to 2015 data, 11.5 
percent of public sector employees earn between KD 600 and 799/month (see Figure 3), 
a salary range in which the attractiveness of dropping out of public employment could be 
overwhelming. While this issue needs further investigation, ideally drawing on detailed 
public sector salary data, the government should be prepared to somewhat adjust the 
lower tiers of the civil service salary pay-scale upwards to prevent a disproportionate drain 
of employees in these ranks. 
A key practical question will be who administers the UCG. Given its access to relevant 
population and employment status data, it would make sense for PACI to do this in coop-
eration with the Ministry of Finance. The registration process for UCG could be based on 
self-targeting; that is, Kuwaiti citizens would have to make an active application to receive 
the benefit. This would potentially discourage wealthy Kuwaitis who are not in need 
of any welfare or social assistance from applying, generating some (however marginal) 
savings. Voluntary relinquishment of the UCG should be presented as a socially desirable 
decision in the communications campaign introducing the reforms, and unclaimed UCG 
funds could be earmarked for specific welfare and development funds. That said, the UCG 
registration process should be made as easy as possible, ideally through a simple online 
interface and registration centres in all neighbourhoods, so that no vulnerable citizens are 
left out.
Policy Options for Other Distribution Policies
The UCG reform policy only makes sense if it is used as an opportunity to adjust other 
inefficient and distortionary welfare policies. Providing all Kuwaitis outside of the public 
sector with a substantial, unconditional benefit will create political flexibility for reform-
ing other distribution policies, as the implicit subsidies incorporated in them will be 
bundled into the UCG. The UCG will specifically make it easier to introduce more strin-
gent means-testing and targeting for social support policies, which can be linked more 
clearly to explicit social objectives. Sanctioning of abuse will also become easier once 
targeted social benefits and general wealth sharing are separated.
Daʿm Reform
As discussed above, without further deep reforms to the private labour market, wage sub-
sidies through the daʿm al-ʿamala system will still be needed to incentivise nationals to 
work in the private sector and close the remuneration gap to the public sector. In princi-
ple, the daʿm system could be discontinued and turned into a higher UCG, but this would 
create the risk of widespread idleness among citizens, an outcome that our interviews 
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indicate is socially undesirable especially for young Kuwaiti men (and the risks of which 
are discussed more below).
That said, the current structure of the daʿm benefits is unusual and could be usefully 
reformed in the course of UCG introduction. It is not clear in particular why higher levels 
of education are rewarded with higher subsidies. The effect of this policy is regressive, as 
Kuwaitis with degrees are likely to find better-paid jobs to start with. It is very unusual 
in international comparison to subsidise the educated. We have also seen above that the 
absolute wage gap between citizens and foreign workers is roughly the same across all 
education levels, and the ratio of Kuwaiti to foreign wages is actually larger at lower levels 
of education. If the daʿm system aims at closing this gap, making payments proportional 
to education makes little sense. As a general principle, the labour market itself should 
reward education and skills, thereby providing incentives to acquire the types of educa-
tion that are actually needed.
We therefore propose a unified daʿm payment around KD 600/month for singles. Existing 
marriage and child allowances can be retained, but should be unified across education 
levels. Thanks to the introduction of the UCG, even educated Kuwaitis in the private sector 
will still be net beneficiaries of the reform despite the standardisation of daʿm payments. 
A unified daʿm payment might create slight incentives for more educated Kuwaitis to seek 
public sector employment, but the UCG will allow the government to recruit much more 
selectively. Removing the education rewards from the daʿm would also reduce incentives 
for acquiring low-quality or fake education, which has been a recurrent issue in Kuwait.
The government should consider creating an automatic link between adjustments of 
public service salaries and the amount of daʿm payments. In the past, government salary 
rises have led to delayed increases in the daʿm, thereby initially hiding the effective total 
cost of the rise and creating temporary incentives to exit the private sector. An automatic 
link would make the effective fiscal cost of increasing public salaries more transparent 
and ensure a continued level playing field between public and private employment.
The availability of the UCG for citizens outside of the public sector will make it easier 
to crack down on the fraud currently happening in the daʿm system we have discussed 
above, which could be easily done through workplace inspections and statistical analysis 
of current salary patterns in the private sector. Tighter policing would become politically 
easier as no citizen would become penniless and everyone would receive a minimum 
share of the national wealth thanks to the UCG.
While tightening the daʿm system, the government should strengthen active labour market 
policies to upskill Kuwaitis and integrate them into the private labour market. The demand 
for such policies is likely to increase, since nationals will have a stronger incentive to seek 
skills needed in the private sector as public employment becomes more remote. Interna-
tional experience shows that wage subsidies are most effective when combined with other 
labour market programmes such as on-the-job training, counselling, information sessions 
and job search assistance.91
91   Helena Ribe, David A. Robalino and Ian Walker, ‘From Right to Reality: Incentives, Labor Markets, and 
the Challenge of Universal Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean’, World Bank (Wash-
ington, DC, 2012), p. 281.
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Pensions Reform
We have seen above that the current pensions system, while having a solid basic architec-
ture, is unsustainable due to the generosity of defined benefit pensions payments. Despite 
regular large government contributions to the PIFSS, the scheme is far from fully funded.
The introduction of the UCG could serve as justification for a gradual move towards 
‘defined contributions’ (DC) pensions above a certain income level, while retaining a 
general defined benefits base that guarantees a minimum payment for all pensioners and 
reduces market risks. A reform along these lines is inevitable in the long run and politically 
more defensible at the moment when a UCG will start ‘topping up’ pensions for all citi-
zens, including ones who have left public employment for retirement. 
The proposed lower-boundary UCG of KD 212/month amounts to 17 percent of the 
average pension in Kuwait,92 implying a significant rise. In cases of a couple where only 
one partner receives a pension, the effective rise would amount to 34 percent. If we assume 
a supplementary increase of the UCG of KD 200/month for citizens outside of the public 
sector (financed by exits from government employment), the effective pensions increases 
would amount to 33 percent for the average pensioner and 65% for a couple relying on one 
pension. Against this background, it should be politically possible to convert pensions 
payments above a certain threshold towards DC with a view to making the system finan-
cially sustainable, while exposing richer pensioners to slightly more market risk.
The DC pensions component could still be administered by the PIFSS, which could 
offer a variety of investment products that contributors could choose from; contributors 
should, however, also be allowed to invest in other pensions products provided by the 
financial sector. Matched employer and government contributions should also continue 
for DC pensions.
The UCG would also work as a basic pension for individuals with no PIFSS pension, 
including divorced or single women of retirement age, requiring correspondingly less 
MoSAL transfers (see below). Pensions reform is a complex topic that cannot be fully 
covered here, not least as we have no raw household survey data on which to assess the 
distribution and correlates of current pensions incomes. It is clear, however, that pensions 
reforms will be politically difficult unless there is a quid pro quo arrangement like the 
introduction of a UCG.
92   ‘Kuwait Has Lowest Retiring Age Among GCC Countries’, Arabic Times.
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Social Safety Net Reform
The introduction of a UCG would also allow a significant clean-up, tightening and clearer 
targeting of social safety payments administered by MoSAL and other agencies.93 A detailed 
assessment of the SSN system and the impact of a UCG on different types of recipients 
is not possible without raw household survey data, but it is still possible to spell out a 
number of policy principles for reform.
The general principle of SSN modernisation should be a move from categorical bene-
fits without means-testing to an SSN that focuses on specific deserving segments only. 
Benefits should have clear and explicit purposes, including labour market activation and 
assisting individuals to move out of beneficiary status into economic independence. Once 
again, such tightening would be politically facilitated by the availability of the uncon-
ditional UCG benefit that would in practice replace categorical benefits for individuals 
without specific needs. Tighter targeting would also allow more effective linkage of social 
assistance to microfinance and entrepreneurship programmes.
In moving away from categorical benefits, the government and MoSAL would need to 
build stronger means-testing capacity in terms of accessing data on individuals’ assets, 
income, household status and so forth – all of which is standard in advanced countries. 
As a general rule, benefits should be phased out gradually with increasing non-benefit 
income, rather than being lost all at once the moment a certain income threshold is passed, 
which currently creates strong incentives to never cross this threshold (the ‘welfare trap’), 
thereby discouraging labour market participation.
At the same time, the government should conduct a detailed review of all individual ben-
efits and abolish ones that serve no clear social purpose, including the general benefits 
for women above 55. In cases where benefits are retained, their maximum amount should 
be reduced by the level of the UCG amount minus the increased average per capita utility 
costs created by the subsidy reforms. Benefits with a clear social purpose and no obvious 
negative externalities, such as rent and housing benefits, disability benefits, student sti-
pends and marriage allowances, can be retained. In principle, they could all be rolled into 
the UCG, but the savings would be comparatively modest. All MoSAL social safety pay-
ments, for example, amounted to 0.43 percent of GDP in 2013, while our estimated savings 
from the above energy reforms amount to 4.2% of GDP – about ten times as much. The 
risk of political resistance from specific concerned groups probably outweighs the fiscal 
benefits of abolishing (rather than tightening) many social allowances.
The government should also retain its current unemployment insurance arrangements, 
which are based on a solid systems design and fairly low cost. In the long run, the ability 
to draw on unemployment benefits in the case of voluntary quits might be reconsidered.
Experience in other countries suggests that means-testing is likely to experience general 
political support in Kuwait. In the World Bank’s MENA SPEAKS surveys, citizens noted a 
93   This section is informed by the 2015 report on the Kuwaiti SSN by the World Bank, but addresses 
social safety reforms beyond MoSAL and against the background of broader distributional reforms, 
particularly the UCG.
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strong preference for poverty-based targeting as opposed to categorical targeting of social 
benefits.94 As the UCG will replace the unconditional component of existing transfers, 
it will be easier to tie benefits over and above the UCG to specific conditions, such as 
participation in labour market training or job search efforts in cases where beneficiaries 
are able-bodied and of working age. The general idea would be that SSN payments would 
selectively top up income from the UCG for targeted interventions with specific social 
purposes. International experience shows that conditional programmes are more effective 
at influencing behaviour95 and that conditional grants clearly outperform unconditional 
grants in terms of affecting educational and training outcomes.96
To enable the consolidation of programmes, clearer means-testing and stricter condition-
ality, the SSN administration will require significant reforms, many of which are already 
outlined in the 2015 World Bank report on SSN reforms in Kuwait. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the government needs to move towards an integrated system that links different 
government agencies that determine benefit eligibility and delivering social assistance. 
There is wide-reaching international experience with such consolidation, with the savings 
it creates and with the integration of SSN tools with other support policies.97 In that 
process, the government should reduce overstaffing at its various social units and provide 
core employees with appropriate specialised training.
Building on existing internal reform debates, the government should consider the cre-
ation of a central social protection fund under a new high council of social protection, 
which would oversee not only MoSAL’s support payments but all other benefits including 
those in areas like housing, labour market support and student assistance. The council 
could also oversee the UCG policy and assess its impact.
The overlap in current programmes could be reduced by developing a unified registry of 
beneficiaries, using modern information technology. The use of biometrics in countries like 
India has created large savings in the SSN area.98 A central electronic portal should allow 
all concerned citizens to manage their benefits and provide required data and documents.
Once the administration has been strengthened and the purpose of specific benefits is more 
clearly defined, the government should introduce performance evaluations for different 
social policy programmes, using field trials to assess their impact on beneficiaries and cre-
ating tracer studies to assess the long-term impact of specific interventions on individuals. 
This would allow ongoing policy adjustment to maximise programme impact and efficiency.
94    Victoria Levin, Matteo Morgandi and Joana C. G. Silva, ‘Inclusion and Resilience: The Way Forward 
for Social Safety Nets in the Middle East and North Africa’, World Bank (Washington, DC, 2012).
95   Sarah Baird, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, Berk Özler and Michael Woolcock, ‘Conditional, Unconditional 
and Everything in Between: A Systematic Review of the Effects of Cash Transfer Programmes on School-
ing Outcomes’, Journal of Development Effectiveness 6/1 (2014), pp. 1–43.
96   Sarah Baird, Craig McIntosh and Berk Özler, ‘Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer 
Experiment’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126/4 (2011), pp. 1709–53.
97   Kathleen G. Beegle, Aline Coudouel and Emma Mercedes Monsalve Montiel, ‘Realizing the Full Poten-
tial of Social Safety Nets in Africa’, World Bank (Washington, DC, 2018).
98   Karthik Muralidharan, Paul Niehaus and Sandip Sukhtankar, ‘Building State Capacity: Evidence from 
Biometric Smartcards in India’, American Economic Review 106/10 (2016), pp. 2895–929.
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Fiscal Impact
A key objective of converting subsidies, excess public employment and inefficient social 
safety provisions into a UCG is to improve the fiscal sustainability of Kuwait’s government 
operations. This section therefore simulates the fiscal impact of these reforms over time 
and compares them to a ‘business as usual’ scenario where state employment and energy 
subsidies continue to grow on their current trajectory.
We consider two scenarios: one where a UCG allows the freezing of public employment, 
with the payroll merely growing 2 percent per year due to the natural effect of promotions, 
and one where the UCG leads to a gradual erosion of public sector employment by 30% 
over ten years. In both cases, we assume that the basic UCG financed through subsidy 
reforms is complemented by a supplementary KD 200 monthly payment to adults outside 
of the public sector. We argue that such a supplementary payment is needed to politically 
justify the freezing of public employment. As discussed above, the basic UCG would be 
insufficient to close the gap between public and private salaries and would only guarantee 
a very basic livelihood. 
The supplementary payment of KD 200 would cost KD 982 million per year in Kuwait’s 
current demographic structure. This is 5.7 percent of current state expenditure, that is, a 
substantial item – yet the public payroll grew by roughly that amount from 2015 to 2016 
alone and is expected to add a similar amount about every two years going forwards. If the 
extra transfer can staunch the growth of the public payroll, it will quickly pay for itself. A 
KD 412 monthly payment for each adult outside of the public sector would provide a basic 
livelihood to everyone and send a powerful political signal justifying substantial reforms 
to the existing wealth distribution system in Kuwaiti.
Figure 17 shows the estimated fiscal balance in a business as usual scenario (based on 
IMF forecasts but extrapolated beyond 2024; see also Figure 10), in a UCG scenario with 
a public sector of constant size and in a UCG scenario with a public sector reducing its 
workforce by 30 percent within ten years. UCG costs are assumed to increase naturally 
by 2 percent a year due to population growth, with additional growth under the erosion 
scenario as former civil servants join the ranks of UCG recipients (adding about KD 50 
million annually to the UCG budget). We assume that non-payroll expenditure continues 
on the same trajectory in all three scenarios.
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Figure 17: Surpluses/Deficits under Business as Usual vs. UCG Scenarios, 2007/08 
to 2033/34
20
07
/0
8
20
08
/0
9
20
09
/1
0
20
10
/1
1
20
11
/1
2
20
12
/1
3
20
13
/1
4
20
14
/1
5
20
15
/1
6
20
16
/1
7
20
17
/1
8
20
18
/1
9
20
19
/2
0
20
20
/2
1
20
21
/2
2
20
22
/2
3
20
23
/2
4
20
24
/2
5
20
25
/2
6
20
26
/2
7
20
27
/2
8
20
28
/2
9
20
29
/3
0
20
30
/3
1
20
31
/3
2
20
32
/3
3
20
33
/3
4
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
Net lending/borrowing business as usual Net lending/borrowing with UCG and no erosion
Net lending/borrowing with UCG and 30% erosion
Source: IMF, own calculations
The graph shows that after incurring small start-up costs, the UCG quickly provides 
considerable savings – particularly if we assume that it will lead to erosion of public 
employment. The savings kick in only gradually, underlining how important it is that the 
UCG is accompanied by a durable commitment to freeze net hiring in the public sector. 
In the long run, reduction in the public payroll is essential to allow the government to 
break even. While further research is needed on the issue, provisional interviews and an 
internal survey by the General Secretariat of the Supreme Council for Planning and Devel-
opment indicate that a UCG would cause a considerable share of incumbent public sector 
workers, women in particular, to leave government to be able to receive a UCG. A higher 
UCG could quickly pay for itself by accelerating the exodus from the public sector. Should 
the exit rate exceed expectations, the UCG could potentially be further increased, while 
using retention tools for critical staff to avoid the loss of core expertise in government 
(see below).
One unknown that is not modelled here is how many individuals leaving the public sector 
would join the private sector as employees, typically drawing on daʿm support payments 
which would reduce fiscal savings. Even in such cases, however, the total cost of UCG and 
daʿm would be considerably lower than that of the average public employee, both because 
of the fairly high average salary in government and because government employment 
creates considerable overhead costs. As a precautionary measure, our scenarios above do 
not assume any reduction in the social benefits budget despite the proposed consolidation 
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and tightening of social assistance, thereby leaving spare fiscal resources for daʿm payments.
Even if we assume shrinkage of the public sector, Kuwait faces continued population 
growth that could lead to long-term fiscal pressures. Even then, the UCG reforms pro-
posed here would buy considerable time for a longer-term transition towards either a 
more productive economy that could generate new non-oil revenue sources or a scenario 
where Kuwaitis increasingly live off returns from the accumulated overseas assets in the 
FGF, which would continue to grow for at least another decade. Under the business as 
usual scenario, Kuwait would face deficits in the mid-2020s, while a UCG scenario with a 
shrinking public sector would see deficits only a decade later. 
The estimates above are meant to be illustrative. Actual fiscal developments will be 
strongly impacted by the unpredictable cycle of the oil markets. Nonetheless, our model-
ling demonstrates the superiority of UCG reforms over business as usual in fiscal terms.
Political Communication
A sustained political communication effort will be key for building public support for 
the UCG introduction and, critically, the accompanying reforms to energy pricing, public 
sector hiring and SSNs. In designing the communications strategy, authorities will be able 
to draw on a range of insights about which types of policies and framings are likely to 
receive popular support. Survey experiments in Jordan have shown that middle-class indi-
viduals tend to support redistribution to the poor,99 demonstrating the need to highlight 
the redistributive effects of the UCG reform which will particularly benefit lower-income 
households. The UCG’s universality will also be an asset for the communications strategy, 
as self-interested voters typically support positive welfare benefits when the policy is tar-
geted sufficiently broadly.100
A survey experiment designed by the author and conducted by YouGov in Saudi Arabia in 
2014 also showed that around 75 percent of Saudi job-seekers and private sector employ-
ees supported a policy under which public employment guarantees are replaced with a 
UCG system. While the generosity of the Saudi state vis-à-vis its citizens is relatively lower 
than that of the Kuwaiti state, public employment is as central a component of the social 
contract as in Kuwait, making the survey results relevant for our context.
It will be important to frame the UCG as a policy that provides Kuwaiti citizens with their 
share in the country’s wealth – and to make very explicit that it will replace other forms 
of wealth sharing permanently. The policy’s higher transparency and inclusiveness should 
be highlighted as much as the fact that the vast majority of households will gain from the 
reform.
Authorities need to be very clear about which other channels of wealth sharing will be 
99   Levin, Morgandi and Silva, ‘Inclusion and Resilience’.
100   Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein, ‘Targeting and Political Support for Welfare Spending’, 
Economics of Governance 2/1 (2001), pp. 3–24.
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reformed or entirely closed, and that these adjustments are permanent. The point that 
there will be no more public employment guarantee needs to be highlighted in particular. 
The communications strategy should also signal that most remaining welfare schemes 
will be means-tested, serve specific social purposes and often be conditional on benefi-
ciaries’ efforts to improve their skills or labour market situation.
These signals will reduce future political pressures for discretionary patronage and allow 
the government to use its non-UCG spending for purposes of economic development 
and the provision of public goods. An unconditional cash benefit provides an ideal line of 
defence against demands for discretionary social spending, as it formalises wealth distri-
bution for all to see and separates it from other forms of spending, unlike the fragmented 
status quo system where patronage is often hidden.
Simple infographics and videos can be used to show how typical households (including 
pensioners) will be better off under the new system and how it improves the sustainability 
of the Kuwaiti system. The information materials should also highlight what households 
can do to benefit even more from the reforms, for example by leaving the public sector, 
improving energy efficiency in their personal lives and so forth. The communications 
strategy should be accompanied by regular focus groups and public opinion surveys to 
gauge the general support for the reforms and assess which frames and communication 
tools are the most efficient. 
Follow-up research that is planned after this project will include several surveys among 
incumbent Kuwait civil servants, retirees and job-seekers to assess their reaction to differ-
ent UCG scenarios. The objective will be both to identify which type of UCG and transition 
policies will find the strongest support and which kinds of ‘framing’ and justification of 
the policies will be the most impactful. Short of such work, any planning of political com-
munications needs to remain preliminary.
Known Unknowns in the Reform Process
We have been able to estimate the immediate consequences of UCG reforms for Kuwait’s 
fiscal situation and for the net income of Kuwaiti households fairly precisely. Other 
behavioural consequences of the reform are harder to predict with precision. There are a 
number of ‘known unknowns’ on which we need to generate further data, which would 
need to be monitored closely as reforms are rolled out, and which might require comple-
mentary policies to ensure that the UCG reforms achieve their main targets.
How Many Citizens Will Leave the Public Sector?
While the Kuwaiti government has some preliminary survey data indicating that many 
women would voluntarily leave government employment for a UCG, we lack more precise 
data to forecast the number of exits over time and as a function of different UCG levels. 
Further surveys would be useful, but even they might not predict actual behaviour reliably. 
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This means that the government will need tools both to prevent excessive short-term 
erosion of public employment and to further incentivise exit in case the uptake of the exit 
option remains below expectations. Exits could be limited through the selective provision 
of retention bonuses in important government agencies and, potentially, the temporary 
reduction of UCG payments to individuals who newly exit public employment. It would 
also be possible to create a lottery under which only a certain number of applicants who 
want to leave the public sector are entitled to the full UCG, while others receive only a 
reduced grant for a certain period.
The reverse problem would be if too few individuals leave the public sector. This would 
be an issue both fiscally and in terms of government efficiency, which would benefit con-
siderably from a reduction of excess employment. To ensure sufficient uptake of the exit 
option, the government could experiment with golden handshakes, that is, additional cash 
bonuses for those willing to leave the public sector. Should this be insufficient, the govern-
ment could consider permanently increasing the UCG to reduce the relative advantage of 
being in public employment.
Who Will Leave the Public Sector?
As important as ensuring that the overall number of exits is acceptable is that those who 
leave do not disproportionately come from the ranks of the best-performing employees. 
‘Adverse selection’ of remaining employees is a problem experienced by the Kuwaiti police 
force and military as well as Kuwait Airways, where golden handshake policies have often 
led to better-skilled employees exiting. Some of this is in fact desirable, as ‘high potentials’ 
can often use their skills more productively in the private sector. That said, there is a need 
for a critical mass of qualified workers in government.
This risk of losing too many of them can be mitigated by conducting surveys that record 
individuals’ likely reaction to the UCG policy, which would allow the identification of 
key educational and career features of those most likely to leave. The above-mentioned 
option of paying retention bonuses should be used especially to avoid the exit of too 
many ‘high potentials’ from the public sector. In the medium term, more flexible salary 
structures could permanently incentivise a critical mass of better-performing employees 
to stay in government.
How Many Nationals Will Remain Idle?
A higher UCG creates the possibility that some nationals will decide to seek neither public 
nor private employment and instead live off their UCG. In principle, this should be an 
acceptable decision: a basic income grant increases citizens’ freedom of choice – and why 
shouldn’t some choose to avoid wage labour and instead devote their life to other activ-
ities? Interviews indicate, however, that in the Kuwaiti context, some forms of economic 
inactivity are seen as less socially desirable than others. Not being in gainful employment 
is not generally considered a social problem for Kuwaiti women, especially when they 
have children. Inactivity for men is seen as potentially more problematic and could, in the 
case of young men with ‘too much time on their hands’, potentially lead to undesirable 
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social behaviour.
The UCG proposed in this paper will provide good material security but not great comfort. 
Our expectation is that most young men would go on to seek private employment (and 
daʿm subsidies) in order to satisfy their lifestyle expectations and be able to start a family. 
Men are the demographic with the highest income needs and expectations, so are more 
likely to join the labour market. More precise information on the issue is needed, however, 
notably surveys investigating reservation wages and desired incomes as well as the likeli-
hood that individuals will eschew employment in cases where they can avail themselves 
of a basic income grant.
The risk of socially deleterious idleness should also be mitigated through community pro-
grammes, active labour market policies and the above-mentioned closer linkage of social 
benefits with labour market conditions and activation efforts, as well as microfinance and 
entrepreneurship programmes. It should be noted that as long as UCG-supported eco-
nomic inactivity does not lead to delinquency or other undesirable social behaviour, it is 
economically much more preferable to excess employment in the public sector, which is 
costlier and undermines government efficiency.
Although it is outside the scope of this paper, the government should also consider com-
plementary labour market reforms that can help to improve available wages on the private 
market. As things stand, for many Kuwaiti private sector employees the share of employ-
er-provided wages in their total income would be rather small under a combined UCG 
and daʿm scenario. This potentially decreases incentives for work effort and career devel-
opment. Improved training can help increase Kuwaitis’ earning power, but in the medium 
term, the government should also consider broader migration reforms that reduce the 
availability of low-cost, low-skilled foreign labour and augment the general wage level, 
especially in the lower-skilled segment. A lump sum fee on foreign labour could be con-
sidered as an incentive to shift towards more productive, higher-skilled workers. Migration 
reform would be politically and economically easier to undertake if more skilled national 
labour was available for employers to start with – which UCG and public employment 
reform would contribute to.
Irresponsible Household Behaviour 
One final ‘known unknown’ that has been highlighted by some interviewees is the risk of 
irresponsible financial behaviour by households reliant on the UCG. What if the available 
cash is regularly frittered away quickly before the end of the month and political pressure 
builds for additional patronage measures?
We can note that the experience with cash grants in the developing world in this regard is 
encouraging: poor households generally increase their savings when receiving SSN trans-
fers and the transfers lead to additional investment in micro-enterprises.101 Cash transfer 
101   Paul J. Gertler, Sebastian W. Martinez and Marta Rubio-Codina, ‘Investing Cash Transfers to Raise 
Long-Term Living Standards’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4/1 (2012), pp. 164–92.
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programmes in Ghana and Zambia, for example, led to reported increases in savings of 11 
and 24 percentage points, respectively. In Ethiopia, Ghana and Malawi, transfers led to a 
reduction of loans and debt repayments.102
To minimise the risk of self-inflicted destitution among UCG recipients, we suggest 
accompanying the UCG introduction with comprehensive awareness campaigns and 
training programmes on responsible budgeting for Kuwaiti citizens. As mentioned above, 
we also suggest maintaining current transfer mechanisms for the in-kind provision of sub-
sidised foodstuffs as well as the rent and housing assistance provided by government. 
While it would be economically optimal to roll all such in-kind provision into cash grants, 
the symbolic value and basic safety aspect of in-kind benefits appear important in the 
Kuwaiti context, and their cost is comparatively small relative to the more problematic 
energy subsidies and public employment outlays. Should the impact evaluation of a fully 
implemented UCG demonstrate that households largely behave responsibly, further con-
solidation of in-kind benefits into the UCG could be considered.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that a move away from energy subsidies and excess public employ-
ment towards direct provision of UCGs for Kuwaiti citizens would improve the fiscal 
sustainability of the Kuwaiti welfare system, would be fairer, more transparent and 
more inclusive, and would specifically benefit lower-income households. It would also 
provide a powerful political justification for reforming existing social safety and security 
mechanisms in Kuwait, which are inefficient and fragmented and in many cases benefit 
higher-income households more than lower-income ones. 
The paper has particularly focused on the conversion of current electricity and water sub-
sidies into citizen cash grants. We have argued that cash grants should be differentiated by 
employment status, with Kuwaitis outside of the public sector receiving higher grants as 
they do not enjoy the implicit subsidy incorporated in government employment. Our est-
mates show that bringing utility prices to the lower level of what is customary in advanced 
countries would create extra income that could finance monthly payments of KD 72 to 
all Kuwaiti children, KD 60 to all Kuwaitis employed in the public sector and KD 212 to 
Kuwaitis outside of the public sector. We have demonstrated that despite higher utility 
prices, the vast majority of Kuwaiti households would be net beneficiaries from the new 
grant. The paper also shows that the impact of higher utility prices on business profits and 
inflation is negligible.
The paper has argued that the KD 212 grant for adults outside of government could be aug-
mented by another KD 200/month on the assumption that this will give the government 
a strong political justification for freezing net hiring in the public sector, thereby creating 
102   Silvio Daidone, Benjamin Davis, Sudhanshu Handa and Paul Winters, ‘The Household and Individu-
al-Level Economic Impacts of Cash Transfer Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa: Synthesis Report’, Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Rome, 2017).
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considerable long-term savings relative to a business as usual scenario. We also expect the 
availability of an augmented UCG to lead a significant share of public sector employees to 
leave their government jobs in order to avail themselves of the new grants, thereby creat-
ing additional fiscal savings through a smaller public payroll. This would address the most 
important and most problematic component of the current social contract in Kuwait: a de 
facto guarantee of public employment that far exceeds the actual administrative needs of 
government. An augmented UCG would allow more Kuwaitis to become entrepreneurs 
or seek productive employment in the private sector, activities that would become more 
attractive thanks to the ability to top up one’s income with the UCG.
The introduction of a UCG would make it possible to consolidate existing social safety 
tools and introduce stringent means-testing, a policy that currently is not consistently 
applied for both administrative and political reasons. The government should build a 
central, consolidated database that allows a reliable assessment of all individuals’ and 
households’ income and wealth situations. The dedicated use of a UCG for general wealth 
sharing with Kuwaiti citizens would make it easier to use social safety tools exclusively 
for dedicated social purposes affecting lower-income households and, where applicable, 
to link social safety payments more closely to labour market activation. We recommend 
retaining certain general welfare payments with high symbolic and political value, such as 
rental and housing support, marriage grants and food subsidies, as their cost is compara-
tively limited.
The paper has also shown that there are a number of ‘known unknowns’ relating to the 
above reforms: it will be difficult to predict how many citizens will leave the public sector 
in general, how many of the better-performing public servants will leave in particular, how 
many nationals will choose to use the UCG to become economically inactive, and what 
levels of financial responsibility among UCG-dependent households will be. The paper 
has suggested data-gathering strategies and mitigation tools to limit potential negative 
outcomes in all these regards.
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